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Abstract
We propose a simple model to assess the evolution of the US labor share and how automation af-
fects employment. In our model, heterogeneous firmsmay choose a manual technology and hire a
worker subject to matching frictions. Alternatively, they may choose an automated technology and
produce using only machines (robots). Our model offers three main insights. First, automation-
augmenting shocks reduce the labor share but increase employment and wages. Second, labor
market institutions play an almost insignificant role in explaining the labor share. Third, the US la-
bor share only (clearly) fell after 1987 because of a contemporaneous acceleration of automation’s
productivity.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation & Contribution
The stationarity of the labor share of aggregate income was a celebrated stylized fact of the 20th cen-
tury: although new technologies were continuously introduced, the labor share apparently fluctuated
around the same level (Kaldor, 1961; Jones and Romer, 2010). Yet, starting at the late 20th century,
a number of authors questioned this stylized fact and pointed out the decline of the labor share in
developed countries including the US. More recently, new empirical evidence has suggested a sus-
tained downward trend of the labor share in a wider range of countries, including both advanced and
developing countries.1
In light of the overwhelming evidence of a downward trend in the labor share, the literature shifted
towards understanding its causes. Two prominent groups emerged within this literature. One group
has focused on how technological change and the technological structure of the economy may affect
the labor share. Namely, this group has emphasized the roles of automation (e.g., Acemoglu and Re-
strepo, 2018), robot- or automation-augmenting technological change (e.g., Berg, Buffie and Zanna,
2018), falling price of capital (e.g., Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014), and the emergence of superstar
firms together with overhead labor costs (e.g., Autor et al., 2017b).2 Another group has analyzed the
role of labor market institutions and their potential interaction with the technological structure of the
economy. In these theories, either the shock emerges in the labor market (e.g., Caballero and Ham-
mour, 1998), or the presence of labor market institutions is crucial for the transmission mechanism
of technological shocks (e.g., Hornstein, Krusell and Violante, 2007).3 Our paper belongs to the sec-
1For earlier contributions questioning the stationarity of the labor share, see, e.g., Blanchard (1997), Caballero and Ham-
mour (1998), Berthold, Fehn and Thode (2002), Jones (2003), and Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003). For more recent contribu-
tions, see, e.g., Bental and Demougin (2010), Elsby, Hobijn and S¸ahin (2013), Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), Oberfield
and Raval (2014), Autor et al. (2017b), and Dao et al. (2017).
2See, as well, Zeira (1998, 2010), Peretto and Seater (2013), Prettner and Strulik (2017),Martinez (2018), Hopenhayn, Neira
and Singhania (2018), and Leo´n-Ledesma and Satchi (2019).
3See, as well, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Bental and Demougin (2010), Young and
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ond group, but instead of analyzing how one particular shock shrinks the labor share, we assess which
shocks are better candidates to explain the fall in the US labor share. Namely, we build a model with
matching frictions to contrast the role of technological factors (automation-augmenting technolog-
ical change and falling price of capital) with the role of changes in labor market institutions (falling
workers’ bargaining power and decreasing flows in the labor market). We conclude that the fall in the
US labor share wasmost likely caused by technological factors.
Parallel to this debate, the observed increasing substitutability of machines for workers has raised
concerns that machines will make labor redundant and eventually terminate employment (Acemoglu
and Restrepo, 2018). Yet, so far, the empirical results indicate that technological shocks (either TFP or
routine-replacing specific) have not been employment-displacing at the aggregate level in developed
economies (Autor and Salomons, 2018 and Gregory, Salomons and Zierahn, 2018). Different models
that allow for a fall in the labor share are unable to simultaneously generate an increase in employ-
ment (e.g., Zeira, 1998; Caballero and Hammour, 1998; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018). In contrast,
our model concurs with the evidence: an automation-augmenting shock reduces the labor share but
increases both employment and wages.
Our paper further contributes to the literature in two other ways because of its different approach.
First, we propose a rather simple model that extends the canonical Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
(DMP) model (similar to Pissarides, 2000, Ch.1). In our model, heterogeneous firms may choose a
manual technology and behave as in the DMP model. Alternatively, they may choose an automated
technology and produce using only machines (robots). The canonical DMP model cannot assess the
effects of automation. But our simple extension can by only adding one equation to the canonical
model. Although the simplicity of our model naturally forced us to abstract from many ingredients,
our approach comes with the benefits of analytical tractability and the ensuing clarity of the mecha-
Zuleta (2018), and Cords and Prettner (2019).
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nisms at play in the model. Furthermore, many of the insights of our model find support in empirical
evidence. Second, most of the contributions in the literature build and adapt growth models. We, on
the other hand, build a model with matching frictions to properly distinguish how changes in labor
market institutions and in technology affect the labor share. Thus, our model offers a different per-
spective on the effects of automation and the evolution of the labor share by bringing the workhorse
model of the labor market (DMPmodel) to the center of the discussion.
1.2 Summary of theModel & Results
Webuild amodel of technology choice withmatching frictions and the followingmain features. When
entering the market, and after paying a sunk cost, each firm faces two alternative technologies to pro-
duce output. These technologies are perfect substitutes upon entry: an entrant firm either chooses
the automated technology, which is capital intensive, or the manual technology, which is labor in-
tensive.4 Each technology entails a specific start-up cost. The automated technology only employs
capital, while themanual technology only employs labor and requires each firm to search for a worker
in a labor market characterized by an aggregate matching function and where wages are set by Nash
bargaining. In the model, at the time of entry, firms draw an endowment (or capability) from a known
probability distribution, resembling an undirected technology-search process (as in, e.g., Benhabib,
Perla and Tonetti, 2017). Each firm then combines this endowment with either technology (although
with possibly different efficiency levels) to determine its productivity. Depending on the draw of the
endowment, the firm chooses its technology. Under rational expectations, a no-arbitrage and a free-
4Jones and Romer (2010) cite evidence that corroborates that many different technologies are used with widely varying
intensities throughout the world. For instance, in Germany, Japan, and the United States, in steel manufacturing one can
observe the use of minimills versus modern integrated mills, whereas in beer production one can observe small family-
run breweries versus mass production equipment breweries. Caselli and Coleman (2006) provide an insightful description
of a context where there are two methods to produce output: one consists of an assembly line where a large number of
(unskilled) workers produce output with hand tools and the other consists of a computer-controlled and -operated facility
that is mainly run by a few (skilled) workers. In our model, we label the former the manual technology and the latter the
automated technology.
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entry condition must be satisfied. The no-arbitrage condition allows for the derivation of an endoge-
nous threshold, i.e., a cutoff level of the stochastic endowment at which firms are indifferent between
one technology or the other. The free-entry condition establishes a link between the two technologies,
so that a sort of complementarity between them endogenously arises in equilibrium at the aggregate
level.5
Ourmodel paves the way to study how automation affects the labor market in models withmatch-
ing frictions. The canonical Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model allows us to study how labor mar-
ket institutions shape wages (versus output) and employment. Our model preserves the mechanisms
but in a richer context: changes in labor market institutions and productivity shocks propagate in
the economy also through the reallocation of resources between firms that choose to operate under
alternative technologies. In this context, the labor share reflects the influence of institutions and pro-
ductivity on both the averagewage level (versus output) and the distribution of firms between the two
technologies (manual versus automated).
In order to inquire into the effects of increasing automation on jobs, we study analytically the ef-
fects of an automation-augmenting technological change in our model. We find that both the average
wage and employment increase as an aggregate-equilibrium result, which is noteworthy given that
manual and automated technologies are ex ante perfect substitutes at the micro level. A rise in the
productivity of machines incentivizes the reallocation of resources from themanual to the automated
technology, displacing labor. Yet, in the aggregate equilibriumof ourmodel, the greater expected value
to open a firm induces a significant rise in the number of firms and output that ultimately outweighs
the labor-displacing effect, increasing employment and wages. Thus, in our model, the aggregate ef-
fect is stronger than the reallocation effect, which agrees with the empirical evidence in Autor and
Salomons (2018) and Gregory, Salomons and Zierahn (2018).
5As will bemade clear later on, this complementarity arises in the sense that a technological shock that augments one of
the technologies/inputs will, to some extent, benefit the other one relativelymore.
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As a second step, we calibrate our model to the US economy and compute the simulated elastic-
ities of key macroeconomic variables with respect to multiple parameters of our model. The goal is
to study quantitatively how the output, employment, average wage, and labor share respond to two
broad types of shocks: technological and labor-market shocks. Regarding the former, we distinguish
between automation-augmenting shocks, manual-augmenting shocks and shocks to the relative cost
of capital (in our model, cost of capital versus vacancy costs) (as in, e.g., Hornstein, Krusell and Vi-
olante, 2007; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018). Regarding the latter
type of shocks, we consider those to the nonemployment income, workers’ bargaining power, match-
ing efficiency, and job destruction rate (as in, e.g., Caballero andHammour, 1998; Bentolila and Saint-
Paul, 2003; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003; Bental and Demougin, 2010).
Two results stand out. First, an automation-augmenting shock increases the average wage and
employment but reduces the labor share. In our model, the labor share falls due to the reallocation of
activity towards the automated technology, which offsets the effect of higher wage and employment.
Yet, the labor share does not fall at the firm level. This result is particularly relevant as it agrees with the
empirical evidence, based on detailed micro data for the US, that points to a (relatively) stable labor
share at the firm level over time (Autor et al., 2017a,b). Second, technological shocks have a much
greater impact on output and the labor share than changes in the labor market institutions (although
the latter have non-neglectable effects on employment). Thus, in light of our model, unless labor
market institutions change massively, technological shocks are the best candidate to explain a fall in
the labor share. All these results agree with recent empirical observations, namely for the US (see, e.g.,
Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Autor et al., 2017a,b; Dao et al., 2017; Autor and Salomons, 2018).
Finally, we conduct experiments on our model bearing in mind the historical behavior of the US
labor share, which we depict in Figure 1 for the period 1963-2007. The real wage per worker grew at a
rate close to that of real output per worker until the late 1980s. After that (and especially after 2000),
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Figure 1: The US Economy: 1963–2007
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Note: Both panels plot data for the US economy between 1963 and 2007 downloaded from the FRED and the BLS. The
panel on the left-hand sideplots the employment rate ofworkers aged 25-54 (prime-age) and the labor share. The vertical
axis of this panel measures percentage points. The panel on the right-hand side plots the output and wage per worker in
the nonfarm business sector (NBS). Both series are normalized to 1 in 1963, meaning that the vertical axis of this panel
measures the ratio of each series relative to its value in 1963. Output per worker is the product of the real output per
hour (OPHNFB) and total hours (HOANBS), both in the NBS, divided by the civilian employment level (CE16OV). Wage
per worker is the real compensation per hour in the NBS (COMPRNFB) multiplied by total hours in the NBS (HOANBS)
and divided by the civilian employment level (CE16OV). This wage ismultiplied by the ratio of the Consumer Price Index
(CPIAUCSL) over the GDP deflator (GDPDEF).
their growth rates diverge. In other words, the US labor share clearly drops only after the late 1980s
(e.g., Elsby, Hobijn and S¸ahin, 2013). Given this evidence, we focus on two time periods: 1967-1987,
characterized by a relatively stable labor share; and 1987-2007, characterized by a falling labor share.
Our goal is to answer three questions. (i) Can our model account for the fall in the labor share in the
second period? (ii) If yes, what are the forces that our model proposes to explain that fall? (iii) Why
are the two periods different as regards the behavior of the labor share? As a calibration strategy, we
consider shocks to alternative subsets of (technological and/or labor market) parameters by targeting
the growth rate of output and wages in the US data within each 20-year period. Then, we compute
the changes in the labor share and employment implied by our model and compare them with the
changes observed in the data for the same time period.
Concerning the 1987-2007 period, our model performs remarkably well in two experiments: the
combination of automation-augmenting and manual-augmenting shocks and the combination of
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cost-of-capital and manual-augmenting shocks. In both cases, the fall in the labor share is extremely
close to that in the data, while the employment rate increases only slightly more. In contrast, experi-
ments that include changes in labor market institutions render disappointing results. As suggested by
recent empirical studies (e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger, 2014; Farber et al., 2018), we consider combina-
tions of shocks that involve shifts in the workers’ bargaining power or in both the job destruction rate
and matching efficiency. These combinations of shocks either increase the labor share or decrease
it at the expense of counterfactual changes in labor market institutions (e.g., a very high increase in
the US labor market flows). We take these results as indicators that the drop in the US labor share
after 1987 wasmost likely caused by technological changes rather than by changes in the labormarket
institutions.
Concerning the 1967-1987 period, our model suggests that the observed change of output and
wages was caused by manual-augmenting shocks, and this is why the labor share did not fall in that
period. Contrasting these results for the 1967-1987 period with those for the 1987-2007 period, then
it becomes clear that the fall after 1987 occurred because of a significant acceleration of automation-
augmenting vis-a`-vis manual-augmenting technological change. This acceleration concurs with the
significant shifts in the task content against labor (and towards automation) after 1987 estimated by
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019). It also concurs with the VAR evidence in Bergholt, Furlanetto and
Faccioli (2019), with recent empirical estimates of capital- vs labor-augmenting coefficients based on
closed-form aggregate-production functions (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018, and references
therein) and with direct evidence on the evolution of the stock of industrial robots (Prettner and Stru-
lik, 2017).
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1.3 Related Literature
As explained earlier, we lay out amodel of technology choice exploiting the idea that, in general, firms
face alternative technologies to produce output, be it a good or a task. The concept of alternative
technologies enters into numerousmodels in the literature and agreeswith the empirical evidence de-
scribed by Jones and Romer (2010) and references therein. In several of thesemodels, e.g., Zeira (1998,
2010), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) and Alesina,
Battisti and Zeira (2018), the incentive for a given firm to adopt one technology vis-a`-vis the other(s)
depends explicitly on a firm-specific exogenous feature. This feature may be interpreted, as in our
model, as a firm’s endowment or capability and determines, ceteris paribus, the firm’s overall produc-
tivity or cost level. A related literature, with a somewhat different approach, allows optimizing agents
to choose the elasticity of output with respect to inputs from a set of known technologies; e.g., Zuleta
(2008) and Peretto and Seater (2013). Other papers let firms optimally choose the vector of factor-
augmenting coefficients in the production function from a given technology menu; e.g., Jones (2005),
Caselli andColeman (2006), Growiec (2008, 2013, 2017), Fadinger andMayr (2014), and Leo´n-Ledesma
and Satchi (2019).
From the literature above, our paper is closer to Zeira (1998, Sec. 7; 2010), Alesina, Battisti andZeira
(2018), and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), with whom it shares the simplifying assumption that the
manual technology employs only labor and the automated (or ’industrial’) technology only capital. In
Zeira (1998, 2010) and Alesina, Battisti and Zeira (2018), there is a final good produced by a continuum
of tasks. As newmachines aremade available for task production, they raise workers’ productivity and
wages. But firms respond to higher wages by replacing workers (manual technology) with machines
(‘industrial’ technology) in the tasks with the lower cost ofmachines. Consequently, thesemodels fea-
ture an aggregate production function characterized by increasing capital intensity and a decreasing
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labor share. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) also devise a model of technology choice and technolog-
ical change where a final good is produced by a continuum of tasks. The authors consider research
activities directed either towards automation of existing tasks (i.e., task production switches from the
manual to the automated technology) or towards the creation of new tasks in which labor has a com-
parative advantage (and, thus, the new task uses the manual technology). While automation reduces
labor supply, the labor share, and possibly wages, the creation of new tasks has the opposite effects.
Depending on the long-run relative cost of the two production technologies (rental rate of capital ver-
sus wages), there may be an equilibrium in which all tasks are automated (and, thus, the labor share
is driven to zero), or one in which both automation and the creation of new tasks coexist (and, thus, a
positive and stable labor share is attained). The lattermay occur because automation reduces the cost
of producing with the manual technology, thus discouraging further automation while incentivizing
the creation of new tasks.
The object of study and approach of our paper differ from that in Zeira (1998, 2010) and Alesina,
Battisti and Zeira (2018). Even though their models provide results on the effects of automation on
the labor share and employment, the authors explore other insights pertaining to different research
questions. In this sense, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) is closer to our paper as we share the main
object of study. Yet, because Acemoglu and Restrepo do not calibrate their model, they only study the
theoretical conditions under which different results occur. In contrast, our calibration of the model
allows us to offer insights on the evolution of the US labor share and employment since 1967.6
Looking into other strands of the literature, our paper relates to the ‘putty-clay’ model by Caballero
and Hammour (1998) and, along different lines, to Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007) and Bental
6In all these models, the mechanisms rely on an aggregate production function for the final good, which ultimately im-
plies a certain complementarity effect between the two alternative inputs in task production (labor versus machines). In
our model, we get a similar effect without positing an aggregate production function. Instead, as explained earlier, the free-
entry condition to open firms establishes a link between the manual and the automated technologies, so that they behave
as complements in aggregate equilibrium.
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and Demougin (2010). Our paper relates to Caballero and Hammour as this paper addresses the issue
of the labor share and explicitly considers a form of labor market frictions. In their model, labor can
appropriate capital due to the relationship-specificity of capital and limited precontracting possibili-
ties, which are influenced by, e.g., the strength of the workers’ bargaining position and by firing costs.
In the short run, appropriation shocks (due to, e.g., higher capital-specificity or firing costs) increase
wages and the labor share. But these shocks also motivate firms to reduce their exposure to future ap-
propriation by decreasing the labor-intensity of new production units. In the long run, firms reduce
hiring, thereby reducing employment, the average wage, and the labor share. These patterns agree
very neatly with the evolution of the French economy in 1967-1995, which is the object of study of
Caballero and Hammour.
Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007) develop amodel with (standard) labor market frictions and
vintage capital. In their model, production requiresmatching onemachine (capital) of a given vintage
with one worker to yield a homogeneous output good. But capital-embodied technological change
renders each vintage obsolete and eventually breaks the existing machine-workermatch. The authors
show that an acceleration of capital-embodied technological change accelerates capital scrapping and
reduces firms’ incentives to create new jobs. This, in turn, shapes labor-market outcomes, yielding an
increase in the level and duration of unemployment, thereby reducing the employment rate and the
labor share. More recently, as a variation on the topic, Bental and Demougin (2010) explore the rela-
tionship between technology and labormarket frictions in amodel in which the worker-firm relations
are characterized by moral hazard, the allocation of bargaining power between firms and workers is
endogenous, and firms’ investment is irreversible. They focus, in particular, on ICT shocks that en-
hance the effectiveness of the monitoring technology, reducing the moral hazard problem. In their
model, these shocks lower the workers’ bargaining power and, thereby, decrease the wages per effec-
tive unit of labor and the labor share.
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The mechanism in our model is closer to the one in Caballero and Hammour (1998) than to those
inHornstein, Krusell andViolante (2007) andBental andDemougin (2010), inasmuch as the former al-
lows for changes in the labor share reflecting shifts in technology choice (in their case, a change in the
labor-intensity of new production units) as a reaction to given exogenous shocks. Such a mechanism
resembles the reallocation betweenmanual and automated technologies in ourmodel. But differently
from the models in these three papers and also the models in Zeira (1998, 2010) and Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2018), our model generates simultaneously a fall in the labor share and an increase in the
average wage and employment. Therefore, our model offers a better fit to the observed dynamics of
the US economy.
Also related to ourmodel, Cords and Prettner (2019) develop amodel with automation andmatch-
ing frictions. In theirmodel, an aggregate production function combines high- and low-skill laborwith
both traditional physical capital and automation capital (e.g., robots). Physical capital complements
both skill types but automation capital is a perfect substitute for low-skill labor and an imperfect sub-
stitute for high-skill labor. Cords and Prettner use this model to study how shifts in the stock of au-
tomation capital differently affect the unemployment and wages of the two types of labor. Yet, they do
not focus on the behavior of the labor share and calibrate their model to the German economy.
Other contributions in the literature focus on alternative mechanisms to explain the shifts in the
labor share. In particular, these contributions exploit the interplay between an aggregate CES pro-
duction function and, namely, factor-augmenting technical progress, the relative price of investment
goods, structural change, or increases in market power (e.g., Acemoglu, 2003; Karabarbounis and
Neiman, 2014; Alvarez-Cuadrado, Long and Poschke, 2018; Berg, Buffie and Zanna, 2018; Eggerts-
son, Robbins and Wold, 2018; Growiec, McAdam and Muck, 2018). We emphasize, in particular, the
results in Berg, Buffie and Zanna. The authors simulate their model so that the economy moves from
one steady state to the other as a consequence of a temporary (exogenous) upward path in the robot-
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augmenting factor. Output per capita rises considerably while the strong induced accumulation of
the non-robot capital guarantees that overall labor demand and the real wage increase in the long
run, while the labor share falls. These results are all consistent with the results in our model follow-
ing an acceleration of the automation-augmenting factor. The results of this literature (as well as of
Cords and Prettner, 2019), however, hinge crucially on the considered magnitude of the elasticity of
substitution between labor and capital (or robots).
Finally, our approach is very much in the spirit of the inter-firm reallocation mechanism analyzed
by Autor et al. (2017b, App. A). Autor et al. develop a partial-equilibrium model of an industry where
firms have heterogeneous (constant) total factor productivity and there is imperfect competition in
the product market. Each firm produces output using physical capital and (variable) labor under a
Cobb-Douglas technology, while putting up a fixed cost measured as overhead labor. There is free
entry and, upon entry, firms take an idiosyncratic productivity draw. The authors show that the firms
with bigger productivity draws (“the superstar firms”) are larger as they produce more efficiently and
capture a higher share of industry output. These firms also have a lower share of fixed costs in to-
tal revenues and, thus, a lower labor share, in line with the authors’ empirical results. When there
is an exogenous change (e.g., a globalization or a technological shock) that favors the most produc-
tive (larger) firms, the aggregate labor share falls as the economic activity shifts towards these low
labor-share firms.7 Similarly, in our model, the labor share mainly shifts because heterogeneous firms
reallocate activity towards those that are capital-intensive. Yet, our mechanism differs from the one
in Autor et al. (2017b, App. A) in important aspects. Our paper expresses the negative relationship
between firm size and the labor share by making explicit the choice between manual and automated
technologies by heterogenous firms, where the former entails search and matching costs in the la-
7Hopenhayn, Neira and Singhania (2018) offer a similar mechanism. They develop a dynamic model of heterogeneous
firms in which larger and older, more productive, firms have lower labor shares as a result of labor overheads. Thus, in this
context, the change in the labor share in the economy also reflects the reallocation of economic activity between firms.
14 GUIMARA˜ES & GIL
bor market while the latter only entails a fixed start-up cost. Therefore, our model allows us to take a
detailed look into the interplay between technology choice, labor market frictions, and labor market
outcomes (including the labor share), while emphasizing the reallocation mechanism.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details our model. Section 3 studies
analytically how an automation-augmenting shock affects employment and wages. Section 4 lays out
the results of our quantitative exercises. In particular, this section presents the simulated elasticities of
our model and the results of our targeted experiments to the periods 1967-1987 and 1987-2007. Sec-
tion 5 discusses how alternative assumptions affect our results. First, this section shows that, although
changes in labor market institutions do not seem to explain the evolution of the US labor share, our
model requires labor market institutions (in particular, wage bargaining) to fit the US evidence after
1967. Second, it shows that if entry costs are proportional to output, our model continues to point to
the acceleration of automation-augmenting technological change to explain the fall in the US labor
share only after 1987. Third, it shows that if the cutoff between technologies in our model is techno-
logically constrained, our model continues to suggest that an automation-augmenting shock raises
employment. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 TheModel
Our model extends the DMP model set in discrete time as in, e.g., Ljungqvist and Sargent (2018, Ch.
29)]. In our model, firms pay an entry cost Ω to enter the market and draw a productivity z from a
distribution G(z) of productivity levels over the interval [zmin,∞).
8 After knowing their productivity,
firms choose between an automated and a manual technology. If a firm chooses the automated tech-
nology, it is capital-intensive, bears the (start-up) cost of capital, κK > 0, and produces zK(z) ≡ zKz
8We interpret this productivity draw as an endowment or capability accessed through an undirected search process by
each firm (e.g., Benhabib, Perla and Tonetti, 2017). We also find a similar assumption in different contexts, including the
seminal paper of Melitz (2003).
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units of output using only capital.9 If a firm chooses the manual technology, it is labor-intensive and
behaves similarly to firms in the DMPmodel: it employs one worker, bargains the wage w(z) with the
worker, bears the (start-up) cost κL/µ(θ) > 0 to fill its vacancy, and produces zL(z) ≡ zLz
α units of
output using only labor. zL denotes the productivity of labor, which contrasts with the productivity
of capital, zK . In the labor market, a standard matching function determines the number of matches.
As a result, the job-filling probability, µ(θ) ≡ χθ−η, and the job-finding probability, f(θ) ≡ χθ1−η, are
functions of the matching efficiency, χ > 0, the elasticity of the matching function with respect to
nonemployed workers, 1 > η > 0, and the labor market tightness, θ.
2.1 Firms
A firm that draws the productivity z has the present-discounted values JL(z) and JK(z) if it employs
the manual and automated technologies, respectively:
JL(z) = zL(z)− w(z) + β(1− δL)JL(z), (1)
JK(z) = zK(z) + β(1− δK)JK(z). (2)
We assume a common discount factor of β and an exogenous firm-destruction probability of δL for
the manual technology and δK for the automated technology.
Different draws of productivity may imply different choices of technology. A firm will only be in-
different between the two technologies if its value net of the respective start-up cost is the same for
the two technologies:
βJL(z
∗)−
κL
µ(θ)
= JK(z
∗)− κK , (3)
9Since capital (the automated technology) is regarded, ex ante, as a perfect substitute of the manual technology, capital
in our model can be interpreted, more specifically, as robots and the cost κK as the cost of a robot. This agrees with the
interpretation of capital by, e.g., Zeira (1998), Prettner and Strulik (2017), and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018).
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where we assume that it takes one period for a worker to start production and we use z∗ to denote the
cutoff productivity draw that makes the firm indifferent between the two technologies. Throughout
this paper, we refer to Eq. (3) as a no-arbitrage condition between the two technologies. Also through-
out this paper, we assume that higher draws of z are favorable to the automated technology relative to
themanual one, implying that α < 1. Thus, for draws of z in the interval [zmin, z
∗], the firm chooses the
manual technology; and for draws of z in the interval (z∗,∞), the firm chooses the automated tech-
nology. This implies that the largest firms (which correspond to the firms with the largest productivity
draws and, thus, the largest sales) are capital intensive, as suggested by the empirical evidence (see,
e.g., Autor et al., 2017a ,2017b). To close the firms’ block of our model, we assume free-entry to open
firms: ∫ z∗
zmin
(
βJL(z)−
κL
µ(θ)
)
dG(z) +
∫
∞
z∗
(JK(z) − κK) dG(z) = Ω, (4)
where Ω is a sunk entry cost.
2.2 Workers
In our model, there is a measure L of risk-neutral workers who are in one of two states: employed or
nonemployed. If employed, a worker earns the wage w(z), which varies with the productivity draw of
the firm, and loses its job with a probability δL. We denote the lifetime income of an employed worker
byE(z):
E(z) = w(z) + β [(1− δL)E(z) + δLU ] . (5)
If nonemployed, a worker enjoys income b ≥ 0 and finds a job with a probability f(θ). We denote the
lifetime income of a nonemployed worker by U :
U = b+ β
[
f(θ)
1
G(z∗)
∫ z∗
zmin
E(z)dG(z) + (1− f(θ))U
]
, (6)
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where 1
G(z∗)
∫ z∗
zmin
E(z)dG(z) is the average expected value of employment.10
2.3 TheWage
Workers and firms bargain over wages such that the bargained wage maximizes the Nash product:
w(z) = argmax (E(z)− U)φ
(
JL(z)−max
[
βJL(z) −
κL
µ(θ)
, JK(z)− κK
])1−φ
, (7)
where the parameter 1 > φ > 0 measures the worker’s bargaining power or, in other words, the
worker’s share of the surplus. In the standard DMPmodel, workers and firms also bargain over wages.
Yet, in the DMP model, the firm’s surplus of the match is merely the difference between the value of
employment and the value of a vacancy (equal to zero, in equilibrium), which is much simpler than
in our model. In our model, a firm has two options. The first is that it may not agree a wage with the
worker and search for another worker. The value of this option is βJL(z) −
κL
µ(θ) ; that is, the firm may
invest κL
µ(θ) to find another worker which will generate a value of βJL(z).
11 The second option is that
it may instead threaten the worker it will move to the automated technology; in this case, its outside
value is given by Jk(z) − κK . Yet, in an equilibrium of our model, the firm will only bargain with the
worker if it has previously chosen the manual technology (that is, zmin ≤ z ≤ z
∗). As a result, the value
of the relevant outside option of the firm is βJL(z)−
κL
µ(θ) and w(z)must satisfy
E(z) − U =
φ
1− φ
(
(1− β)JL(z) +
κL
µ(θ)
)
. (8)
10Although E(z) depends on z, U does not. z is specific to a firm and, thus, only influences the wage of a particular job; it
does not influence the value of nonemployment. Instead, the value of nonemployment depends on the distribution ofG(z)
in the range that firms decide to open manual firms: [zmin, z
∗].
11In the DMPmodel, the firmmay also threat it will search for another worker. But in that model the value of this option
is zero due to the free-entry condition.
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Making use of Eqs. (1-6), we rewrite the previous equation as
w(z) =
1− φ
1− φβ
b+
φ
1− φβ
[
(1− β)zL(z) +
κL
µ(θ)
(1− β(1− δL))
]
+
βf(θ)
φ
1− φβ
(
(1− β)
[
Ω−
∫
∞
z∗
(JK(z)− κK) dG(z)
]
1
βG(z∗)
+ (1− β)
κL
βµ(θ)
+
κL
µ(θ)
)
. (9)
As in the DMP model, wages increase with the nonemployment income, b, the productivity of the
match, zL(z), and with labor market tightness, θ. This equation, however, is more complex than the
one in the DMP model due to the mechanism of technology choice in our model and its interaction
with labor market frictions.
2.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is defined at the aggregate level of the economy and is characterized
by the vector (θ, z∗, w(z)), which satisfies the no-arbitrage condition, Eq. (3), the free-entry condition,
Eq. (4), and the wage equation, Eq. (9). Furthermore, in equilibrium, the flows from employment to
nonemployment must equal the flows from nonemployment to employment. This implies that after
we derive the vector (θ, z∗, w(z)), the employment rate satisfies n = f(θ)
f(θ)+δL
.
In the equilibrium of ourmodel, we obtain the output, y, by summing up the production ofmanual
and automated firms. To measure the production of each technology, we use the product of the num-
ber of firms using that technology and their (conditional) average production. We easily obtain the
production of manual firms: because eachworker corresponds to amanual firm, there are nLmanual
firms, each producing an average of 1
G(z∗)
∫ z∗
zmin
zL(z)dG(z) units of output. But it is more intricate to
obtain the production of automated firms as first we need to pin down their number. Every period
there is a measure of firms entering the market that satisfies Eq. (4). A proportion G(z∗) choose the
manual technology and a proportion 1−G(z∗) choose the automated technology. In equilibrium, the
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number of entering firms choosing themanual technology is f(θ)(1−n)L, which equals the number of
manual firms exiting the market, δLnL. Because the fractionG(z
∗) of total entering firms corresponds
to δLnL manual firms, there are δLnL
1−G(z∗)
G(z∗) automated firms entering every period. Furthermore,
an automated firm lasts on average 1/δK periods. Thus, there are
δL
δK
nL1−G(z
∗)
G(z∗) automated firms, each
producing an average of 11−G(z∗)
∫
∞
z∗
zK(z)dG(z) units of output. Output in our model, then, is
y ≡
nL
G(z∗)
(∫ z∗
zmin
zL(z)dG(z) +
δL
δK
∫
∞
z∗
zK(z)dG(z)
)
. (10)
In our paper, it is essential to define the labor share, LS, which corresponds to the fraction of
output paid to workers. In our model, there are nL employed workers, each receiving an averagewage
of 1
G(z∗)
∫ z∗
zmin
w(z)dG(z). Using the expression for output of Eq. (10), after a few rearrangements, we
write the labor share as12
LS ≡
∫ z∗
zmin
w(z)dG(z)∫ z∗
zmin
zL(z)dG(z) +
δL
δK
∫
∞
z∗
zK(z)dG(z)
. (11)
3 Will Machines Terminate All Jobs?
The rising substitutability of machines for workers has driven the conception that machines will sig-
nificantly reduce (and ultimately terminate) employment. Our model, however, contradicts this con-
ception. We study the effects of an automation-augmenting shock (a rise in zK) and conclude that a
rise in the productivity of machines increases both wages and employment.
12As we assume that κL, κK , and Ω are not expressed in labor units, these costs do not contribute to labor income and,
thus, do not directly affect the labor share.
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3.1 Analytical Results
In this section, we study analytically how a rise in zK changes the labormarket tightness and, thus, the
employment rate. To ease our exposition and derivations, we assume thatα = 0 (implying zL(z) = zL),
but in the next section we show that our results hold under other calibrations of α. If α = 0, our model
closely resembles the standard DMP model and we can write the wage equation that satisfies Eq. (9)
as
w = (1− φ)b+ φ(zL + θκL)− φ
[(
zKz
∗
1− β(1 − δK)
− κK
)
[(β − 1)f(θ) + 1− β(1− δL)]
]
, (12)
which only differs from the wage equation of the standard DMP model because it includes a third
term on the right-hand side. An important implication of α = 0 is that the wage is independent of
the productivity draw z. Thus, the value of the manual technology JL(z) is the same for all draws of z.
Log-linearizing the no-arbitrage condition, Eq. (3), and the wage equation, Eq. (12), we obtain
θˆ =
A
B
(zˆK + zˆ∗), (13)
whereA ≡ zKz
∗
1−β(1−δK )
(
1− βφ+ βφ (1−β)χθ
1−η
1−β(1−δL)
)
> 0,B ≡ −
(
φβ
(1−β)(1−η)
(
zKz
∗
1−β(1−δK )
−κK
)
χθ1−η+θκL
1−β(1−δL)
+ η κLθ
η
χ
)
<
0, and we use hats to denote log-linear variables. (See Appendix A.1 for more details on the deriva-
tions.) The signs of A and B imply that a rise in zK will only increase θ if the elasticity of z
∗ with
respect to zK is lower than −1. Thus, we must understand how a change in zK changes the distri-
bution of resources between the manual and automated technologies before we know its effects on
employment.
To this end, we continue to assume that α = 0 and combine the free-entry condition, Eq. (4), with
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the no-arbitrage condition, Eq. (3), to derive:
zK
(∫
∞
z∗
zdG(z) + z∗G(z∗)
)
= (Ω + κK)[1− β(1− δK)]. (14)
At this stage, Eq. (14) already provides an important result. If α = 0, z∗ is orthogonal to θ and w
and to all of the labor market parameters and institutions (measured by zL, b, φ, δL, κL, χ, and η). This
implies that the role of labor market parameters and institutions is circumvent to the labor market,
without any effect on how resources are split between the manual and automated technologies. In
our simulations below, we show that this result does not hold if α 6= 0. Yet, even in this case, a change
in b, φ, δL, κL, χ, or η has a minor effect on z
∗ and the labor share.
Moving to the log-linearization of Eq. (14), we obtain the elasticity of z∗ with respect to zK :
zˆ∗
zˆK
= −
∫
∞
z∗
zdG(z) + z∗G(z∗)
z∗G(z∗)
. (15)
(See Appendix A.2 formore details on the derivations.) Independently of the distribution of productiv-
ity draws, this elasticity is lower than −1. Thus, if the productivity of the automated technology rises,
by Eq. (13), employment rises.
3.2 Interpretation and Discussion
To interpret the mechanism underlying an elasticity zˆ
∗
ˆzK
lower than −1, we first recall that the no-
arbitrage condition in Eq. (3) links the manual and the automated technology at the cutoff z∗. This
together with the assumption that the automated technology is multiplicatively linear in z imply, per
se, a reallocation from the manual to the automated technology with an elasticity of exactly −1. This
is expressed by the denominator and the second term in the numerator on the right-hand side of Eq.
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(15).13 On the other hand, the value of the ‘automated’ technology increases with the productivity
draw z multiplied by zK , being z everywhere larger than z
∗ for this technology. This implies that, by
the free-entry condition, Eq. (4), a firm entering the market must factor in the whole (conditional)
expected value of z as regards the automated-technology option (and not only the value at the cutoff
z∗). When the economy is hit by a positive shock to zK , the average value of the automated technology
increases, which reinforces the reallocation of resources towards this technology. This is expressed by
the first term in the numerator in Eq. (15). Consequently, for a given shift in zK , the cutoff z
∗ shifts
more than proportionally in order to satisfy Eq. (4). In other words, the fact that the value of entering
depends on a non-null measure of z under the distribution G(z) induces a (negative) multiplier effect
in z∗.14
Our result that an increase in zK raises employment is noteworthy given that the manual and au-
tomated technologies are ex ante perfect substitutes at the micro level. If the automated technology
becomesmore profitable following the rise in zK , it is only natural that some firms entering themarket
steer away from the manual technology and invest in the automated technology. In our model, this
reallocation effect is captured by the fall in z∗, which directly reduces employment. Yet, as our model
13We note that if the productivity of the automated technology is concave in z, then the effect of the denominator and the
second term in the numerator of Eq. (15) alone implies an elasticity smaller than−1.
14The elasticity of z∗ with respect to zK is also lower than−1 for other calibrations of α. To see this, note that the elasticity
inmore general terms can be written as
zˆ∗
zˆK
= −
zK
(∫∞
z∗
zdG(z) + z∗G(z∗)
)
zKz∗G(z∗)− βz∗
∫ z∗
zmin
j′L(z
∗)g(z)dz
,
where we use the definition of jL(z) ≡ zL(z) − w(z) and we assume that δK = δL = δ without much loss of generality.
(See Appendix A.2 for more details on the derivations.) j′(z) is the derivative of jL(z) with respect to z. If α > 0, j
′
L(z
∗) > 0
because a higher productivity draw raises the return zL(z) by more than w(z) (see Eq. (9)). Thus, if α > 0, the elasticity of
z∗ with respect to zK is even more negative than under the case of α = 0. In this case, a firm entering the market must also
consider the (conditional) expected value of z as regards the manual-technology option. The decrease in z∗ induced by a
rise in zK shifts resources from the most productive and valuable manual-technology firms to the automated technology.
Hence, the average value of the manual technology falls, which reinforces the mechanism described in the text. This is
expressed by the second term in the denominator in the equation above. To return an elasticity greater than−1, αmust be
(sufficiently) negative, implying that a higher productivity draw reduces the profitability of the manual technology. In our
simulations below, α = −0.2 continues to imply an elasticity lower than−1 because, givenG(z∗) < 1 (i.e., there is a positive
mass of firms that choose the automated technology), the first term in the numerator still compensates for the second term
in the denominator.
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shows, we should distinguish the implications of automation at the micro and at the aggregate level.
In ourmodel, the choices made by individual firms at themicro level give rise to a sort of complemen-
tarity at the aggregate and general-equilibrium level that promote greater firm entry. It turns out that
the rise in zK creates incentives to open firms (aggregate effect; size of the economy) that surpass the
reallocation effect, leading to a net increase in employment.
Looking at Eqs. (3), (4) and (9) further suggests that a rise in zK increases employment even if α 6= 0
(as we confirm in Section 4.2) and even if we conjecture different setups of our model. As long as Ω
is constant, a rise in
∫
∞
z∗
(JK(z)− κK) dG(z) leads to an increase of the left-hand side of Eq. (4) that
must be compensated by either reallocation (change in z∗) or an increase in the costs of the manual
technology (greater wages, w(z), or greater labor market tightness, θ). Changes in z∗, however, can
only exacerbate the rise on the left-hand side of Eq. (4) as firms only shift between technologies if it
increases their profitability upon entry. Moreover, looking at Eq. (9), zK has a negative direct effect
on wages (by increasing JK(z)), which is amplified by the fall in z
∗ as implied by Eq. (3) (and the fact
that the costs of the manual technology must increase to balance Eq. 4). Thus, after an automation-
augmenting shock, the labor market must become tighter, increasing employment.15
Our result that the aggregate effect is stronger than the reallocation effect echoes the empirical re-
sults by Autor and Salomons (2018) and Gregory, Salomons and Zierahn (2018). Autor and Salomons
study the effect of total factor productivity (TFP) shocks on employment using data onmultiple indus-
tries for 18 OECD countries since 1970. Their results indicate that the direct effect of TFP has been to
displace employment in the sectors in which it originates. Yet, their results also indicate that the direct
effect of TFP is more than outweighed by indirect effects. Namely, Autor and Salomons conclude that
an increase in TFP in one sector generates employment gains in the downstream customer industries
15The logic above implies that an automation-augmenting shock leads to greater employment even if we were to con-
jecture a version of our model in which κK would increase as a result of the shock as long as
∫∞
z∗
(JK(z)− κK) dG(z) still
increases.
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and in other sectors through greater aggregate demand that more than offset its direct employment-
displacing effects. Gregory, Salomons and Zierahn, on the other hand, analyze the effects on employ-
ment of a more specific type of innovation: routine-replacing technological change (RRTC) in Europe
from 1999 to 2010. Still, their findings are very similar to the ones by Autor and Salomons: the direct
effect of RRTC has been to significantly reduce employment (about 1.6 million jobs) but these effects
have been offset by the indirect effects of RRTC. They conclude that RRTC has increased employment
by about 1.5 million jobs.
3.3 Graphical Analysis
Asmentioned above, ourmodel has a closer resemblance to the DMPmodel if α = 0. Thus, under this
condition, we can use the typical graphical analysis of the DMP model to gather further information
on the effects of the automation-augmenting shock. Figure 2 plots the equilibrium of ourmodel in the
wage-tightness space assuming α = 0. The equilibrium in this space is obtained by the intersection
of the wage equation, Eq. (12), and the no-arbitrage condition, Eq. (3) (which replaces the free-entry
condition of the DMP model). Both equations maintain their main properties from the DMP model.
In tighter labor markets, workers demand higher wages, implying a positively-sloped wage equation.
Also in tigher labor markets, the hiring costs are higher because of the greater firm competition for the
same pool of nonemployed workers. As a result, in tighter labor markets, manual firms only attain the
same value if wages are lower, implying the negatively sloped curve named No-arbitrage in Figure 2.
The slope of this curve becomes clearer if we rearrange Eq. (3) as
βw = βzL +
(
κK −
κL
µ(θ)
)
[1− β(1− δL)]− zKz
∗
1− β(1 − δL)
1− β(1 − δK)
.
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This equation also clarifies that the no-arbitrage condition shifts up after a rise in zK because zKz
∗ falls
(as we have shown in the case of α = 0). The same logic applies to the wage equation, also implying
an upward shift. Thus, unambiguously, an automation-augmenting shock increases wages.
Figure 2: Equilibrium wage and market tightness - the effect of higher zK
Note: This figure plots the effects of an in increase in zK for the equilibrium of our model in the wage-tightness space
assuming that α = 0 and the free-entry condition, Eq. (14), is satisfied. The intersection of the solid lines represents the
equilibrium before the rise in zK , whereas the intersection of the dashed lines represents the equilibrium after the rise
in zK .
4 Simulations: Explaining the Labor Share
Considering the clear evidence of a downward trend in the labor share, a debate has emerged on
whether this trend is mainly driven by technological or by changes in labor market institutions. Our
model suggests that labormarket institutions (relative to automation) play an almost insignificant role
in explaining the labor share. The model also indicates that the US labor share only falls after the late
1980’s due to the acceleration of automation’s productivity in that period.
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4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model to monthly US data and summarize our benchmark calibration in Table 1. In
particular, we set β = 0.996, implying an annual discount rate of 4.91%. We set δL = 0.036, which
equals the average job destruction rate in the US from 1948 to 2010 (Shimer, 2012). And to maintain
the parallelism between the two technologies, we set δK = 0.036. To calibrate the elasticity of the
matching function with respect to nonemployment, we draw on the survey of Petrongolo and Pis-
sarides (2001) and set η = 0.5. We also set φ = 0.5 and normalize Ω = 1, κK = 1, and L = 1. In the
literature, it is common to fix b ≈ 0.7zL (e.g., Hall and Milgrom, 2008, Pissarides, 2009, and Coles and
Kelishomi, 2018). Based on this, we fix b = 0.7zLz
α
min. To be consistent with the evidence on firm size
distribution (e.g., Ghironi and Melitz, 2005, Luttmer, 2007, Gomes and Kuehn, 2017), in our model,
firms draw their productivity from a Pareto distribution, i.e., G(z) = 1 −
(
zmin
z
)ξ
, where ξ determines
the shape of the distribution. We set zmin = 0.15 because of the normalization of κK and Ω. To cali-
brate ξ, we follow Ghironi and Melitz (2005), who use ξ to target the standard deviation of sales in the
US plants. In our case, this target implies ξ = 3.12.
Table 1: Benchmark Calibration
Discount factor: β = 0.996
Rate of manual-firm destruction: δL = 0.036
Rate of automated-firm destruction: δK = 0.036
Matching function elasticity: η = 0.5
Workers’ bargaining power: φ = 0.5
Labor productivity (elasticity): α = 0
Minimum productivity draw: zmin = 0.15
Power term of the Pareto distribution: ξ = 3.12
Nonemployment income: b = 0.7zLz
α
min
Entry cost: Ω = 1
Cost of Capital: κK = 1
Size of the labor force: L = 1
Regarding the productivity of the manual technology, we start by assuming that α = 0, implying
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that the productivity of labor-intensive firms is independent of the productivity draw (i.e. zL(z) = zL).
In our sensitivity analysis, however, we consider cases in which z improves the value of the manual
technology (α = 0.2) and in which z deteriorates the value of the manual technology (α = −0.2).16
Regarding the remaining parameters, zL, zK , κL, and χ, to increase the comparability of our results
under the different experiments carried out in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we pin down their values to target
(i) the prime-age (aged 25-54) workers’ employment rate, n,17 (ii) the labor share, LS, (iii) the labor
market tightness value, θ, and (iv) the equilibrium proportion of firms that employ the manual tech-
nology, G(z∗). In all our experiments, we target G(z∗) = 50% and θ = 1.18 The targets of n and LS
change according to the simulation.
4.2 Simulated Elasticities
In this section, we present the simulated elasticities of key macroeconomic variables with respect to
multiple parameters and under various calibrations of our model. We study how the output, y, labor
share, LS, employment, n, average wages, w ≡
∫ z∗
zmin
w(z)dG(z), and cutoff, z∗, change in response
to two broad types of shocks: technology and labor-market shocks. Regarding technology shocks, we
distinguish between automation-augmenting shocks,∆zK , manual-augmenting shocks,∆zL, shocks
to the cost of capital, ∆κK , and shocks to the vacancy costs, ∆κL. Regarding labor-market shocks,
we consider nonemployment income, ∆b, workers’ bargaining power, ∆φ, matching efficiency, ∆χ,
and job destruction rate, ∆δL. To make the elasticities comparable, every experiment refers to a 1%
increase in the respective parameter. And, in all experiments, we recalibrate the model to target an
16Although we have no empirical counterpart of the parameter α, we note that our assumption of a Pareto distribution
(for the productivity draws) bounds its calibration. The Pareto distribution implies that there is a large mass of firms with
productivity close to theminimumproductivity draw, zmin. All of these firmsuse themanual technology. And, in Section 4.2,
we show that the elasticity of z∗ with respect to zK grows at increasing rates as we increaseα. Thus, ifα is (sufficiently) larger
than 0.2, the elasticity zˆ
∗
ˆzK
is so high that the cutoff z∗ gets very close to zmin and the algorithm that runs the simulations of
our model is unable to converge.
17We target the employment rate of prime-age workers because our model abstracts from demographic changes.
18As in Shimer (2005), our calibration strategy implies that a different target for θ does not have any effect on our results.
Thus, we simply normalize our target for θ to 1.
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employment rate of n = 76% and a labor share of LS = 61%.19 Table 2 shows the simulated elasticities
of our model under the baseline calibration. This table confirms the analytical results of Section 3 and
offers a number of other results.
Table 2: Results α = 0
∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆w ∆z∗
∆zK 5.08 -4.09 0.34 0.44 -2.55
∆zL 0.95 0.41 0.23 1.12 0.00
∆κK -1.85 1.58 -0.13 -0.17 1.21
∆κL -0.15 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02 0.00
∆b -0.56 0.11 -0.56 0.11 0.00
∆φ -0.24 0.05 -0.24 0.05 0.00
∆χ 0.30 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.00
∆δL -0.08 -0.41 -0.37 -0.13 0.00
Note: This table shows the effects of the shocks to the parameters using our benchmark calibration. All values refer to
percentage changes and all shocks are of 1%. Thus, the values in this table may be interpreted as elasticities. In the first
column, we write the respective source of the shock. In the remaining columns, we write the elasticities of output, labor
share, employment, average wages, and cutoff.
Table 2 confirms that a rise in the automated technology productivity, zK , increases employment.
The significantly negative elasticity of z∗ with respect to zK implies that a rise in zK reallocates re-
sources from the manual to the automated technology, displacing labor. But, the greater value to
open a firm induces a significant rise in the number of firms and output that ultimately outweighs the
labor-displacing effect and increases employment. Table 2 also shows that a rise in zK increases wages
but massively reduces the labor share. In our model, the increase in employment allows workers to
demand higher wages and capture a greater share of the match surplus. (See the graphical analysis in
Section 3.3.) Yet, the greater employment and wage are not able to offset the shift of resources towards
the automated technology, which implies the fall in the labor share.20
19Our targets are the labor share in the nonfarm business sector and the average employment rate of prime-age workers
in the US from 1963 to 2018. Both series are retrieved from the BLS.
20As noted earlier, our model features gross complementarity between the two technologies as an aggregate equilibrium
result of an automation-augmenting shock (a rise in zK). In the standard framework of a neoclassical production function,
gross complementarity alsomeans that an increase in the quantity of one factor implies an increase in the elasticity of output
with respect to the other factor; under perfect competition, this implies an increase in the other factor’s share of output
(see, e.g., Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003). Yet, in our model, which departs from the assumption of perfect competition in
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Our results agree to a large extent with the results in Berg, Buffie and Zanna (2018). Although our
models differ in multiple regards, an increase in the productivity of robots in their model also leads
to a considerable rise in output, which ultimately increases the real wage but reduces the labor share.
Their model, however, is silent on the labor supply response because it is assumed to be inelastic.
In this regard, our results are closer to the numerical findings in Cords and Prettner (2019). These
authors analyze quantitatively the effects of an increase in the ratio of industrial robots per manufac-
turing workers on low- and high-skill labor. By calibrating their model with German data, they find
that overall employment rises with automation since the increase in high-skill manufacturing jobs
compensates for the decrease in low-skill jobs.
The fact that the labor share drops in our model after a rise in zK further echoes the empirical
results by Autor and Salomons (2018). As mentioned earlier, Autor and Salomons conclude that TFP
shocks have not been labor-displacing because the indirect effects have outweighed the direct effects.
This, however, is not the case for the labor share: the direct negative effect of TFP on the labor share
has not been outweighed by the positive indirect effects. Thus, in Autor and Salomons’ data, TFP
shocks work similarly to a rise in zK in our model: they both increase employment and reduce the
labor share.
Table 2 also confirms that the labor market parameters do not affect the allocation of resources
between the two technologies when α = 0 because they do not change the cutoff, z∗. Furthermore,
technological shocks have a much greater impact on output and the labor share than equally propor-
tional changes in the labor market institutions. For example, a rise in the cost of capital, κK , implies a
change in the labor share about 53 times larger than that implied by a rise in thematching efficiency, χ.
Thus, unless labor market institutions change massively, technological shocks are the best candidate
the labor market, gross complementarity comes hand-in-hand with a decrease in the labor share in the aftermath of an
automation-augmenting shock.
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to explain a fall in the labor share.21
This result leans against a theoretical literature arguing that the labor share has fallen in recent
decades due to changes in labor market institutions (e.g., Caballero and Hammour, 1998 and Bental
and Demougin, 2010). We should not, however, take literally our result that changes in labor mar-
ket institutions play a minor role. Our model is simple and parsimonious, which has its advantages
but also implies that it abstracts from other channels. For example, our model assumes the extreme
case that the manual technology only employs labor and the automated technology only capital (as
in Zeira, 1998, 2010, Alesina, Battisti and Zeira, 2018, and Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018). Thus, our
model abstracts from the interactions between capital and labor at the micro level, which influence
how labor market institutions shape the labor share in this theoretical literature. But our model and
the models within this theoretical literature also differ in another important result: the latter models
usually predict that the labor share and employment drop simultaneously while our model predicts
that they may go in opposite direction; this makes our model broadly consistent with the US expe-
rience as we show in Section 4.3. Moreover, even though simple, our model is in line with another
strand of literature. For example, as argued by Autor et al. (2017b), the fact that the labor share has
fallen in countries with very different labor market institutions points to the existence of other factors
to explain the drop in the labor share. The empirical work of Dao et al. (2017) confirms that logic: for
developed countries, Dao et al. conclude that policy and institutional factors (including labor market
institutions) barely play a role in explaining the fall in the labor share; conversely, technological chan-
nels explain about half. Furthermore, our results concur with the argument by Karabarbounis and
Neiman (2014) that the falling price of capital is a good candidate to explain the fall in the labor share.
Tables 3 and 4 show that our main conclusions from Table 2 hold under different calibrations of α
21Table 2 also shows that labor market institutions have non-neglectable effects on employment but have limited power
to change wages.
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Table 3: Results – α Sensitivity Analysis
α = −0.2 α = 0.2
∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆w ∆z∗ ∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆w ∆z∗
∆zK 3.04 -2.19 0.37 0.42 -1.44 53.07 -33.99 0.43 0.62 -12.59
∆zL 1.06 0.33 0.26 1.14 -0.05 0.45 0.86 0.21 1.11 0.32
∆κK -1.23 0.91 -0.15 -0.17 0.73 -4.88 4.86 -0.11 -0.15 3.85
∆κL -0.15 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 0.00 -0.15 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02 0.00
∆b -0.67 0.11 -0.67 0.11 0.00 -0.48 0.10 -0.48 0.10 0.00
∆φ -0.24 0.04 -0.24 0.04 0.00 -0.24 0.05 -0.24 0.05 0.00
∆χ 0.30 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.00 0.30 0.04 0.30 0.04 0.00
∆δL -0.19 -0.34 -0.40 -0.14 0.05 0.36 -0.82 -0.35 -0.12 -0.27
Note: This table shows the effects of the shocks to the parameters using our benchmark calibration except for the elas-
ticity of labor productivity, α. All values refer to percentage changes and all shocks are of 1%. Thus, the values in this
table may be interpreted as elasticities. In the first column, we write the respective source of the shock. The remaining
columns are divided in two panels. In the panel to the left, we write the elasticities of output, labor share, employment,
average wages, and cutoff assuming α = −0.2. In the panel to the right, we write the elasticities of the same variables but
assuming α = 0.2.
and targeted G(z∗): a rise in zK raises wages and employment but reduces the labor share; and tech-
nological shocks have a much greater impact on output and the labor share than changes in the labor
market institutions. There are, however, two new and interesting results. Economies with a relatively
highα and a relatively low initial proportion ofmanual firms,G(z∗), havemuch higher elasticities with
respect to automation-augmenting shocks.
If α = 0, all manual firms have the same value. But if α > 0, the productivity and (thus) the value of
the manual technology increases with the productivity draw z. In this case, the decrease in z∗ after a
rise in zK shifts resources from the most productive and valuable manual intensive firms to the auto-
mated technology. Therefore, the average value of the manual technology drops, which reinforces the
reallocation of resources observed when α = 0. (Recall the analytical details in Footnote 14 above.)
If G(z∗) is low, then z∗ is also low and close to the lower bound zmin. This implies a higher prepon-
derance of the mass of firms that operate the automated technology and, hence, of the (conditional)
expected value of z for z > z∗ in the transmission mechanism (see Eq. (15)). This leverages the effect
of a shock in zK , which translates into a greater elasticity of z
∗ with respect to zK .
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Table 4: Results –G(z∗) Sensitivity Analysis
G(z∗) = 0.4 G(z∗) = 0.6
∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆w ∆z∗ ∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆w ∆z∗
∆zK 10.19 -8.48 0.34 0.50 -3.47 3.02 -2.20 0.36 0.39 -2.00
∆zL 0.89 0.40 0.20 1.09 0.00 1.03 0.42 0.29 1.17 0.00
∆κK -3.06 2.84 -0.12 -0.18 1.55 -1.17 0.89 -0.14 -0.15 0.98
∆κL -0.15 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02 0.00 -0.15 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 0.00
∆b -0.48 0.10 -0.48 0.10 0.00 -0.71 0.11 -0.71 0.11 0.00
∆φ -0.24 0.05 -0.24 0.05 0.00 -0.24 0.04 -0.24 0.04 0.00
∆χ 0.30 0.04 0.30 0.04 0.00 0.30 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.00
∆δL -0.03 -0.41 -0.34 -0.10 0.00 -0.17 -0.42 -0.43 -0.16 0.00
Note: This table shows the effects of the shocks to the parameters using our benchmark calibration but assuming a
different target for the proportion of firms that use the manual technology,G(z∗). All values refer to percentage changes
and all shocks are of 1%. Thus, the values in this table may be interpreted as elasticities. In the first column, we write
the respective source of the shock. The remaining columns are divided in two panels. In the panel to the left, we write
the elasticities of output, labor share, employment, average wages, and cutoff assumingG(z∗) = 0.4. In the panel to the
right, we write the elasticities of the same variables but assumingG(z∗) = 0.6.
4.3 Targeted Simulations
The evidence by, e.g., Elsby, Hobijn and S¸ahin (2013) indicates that the labor share started to fall in
the US in the late 1980s and, more specifically, around 1987. Given this evidence, in this section, we
conduct experiments to answer three questions: (i) can our model account for the fall in the labor
share after 1987? (ii) If yes, what are the forces that our model proposes to explain that fall? Finally,
(iii) why are the periods before and after 1987 different?
In our experiments, we use our model to analyze two 20-year periods: 1967-1987 and 1987-2007.
To calibrate the model, we always use our benchmark calibration as specified in Table 1 and our tar-
gets θ = 1 and G(z∗) = 0.5. But, depending on the 20-year period, we target the employment rate, n,
and the labor share, LS, to those observed at the beginning of the period.22 These two targets imply
that the values of the parameters zL, zK , κL, and χ (only) pertain to the 20-year period under analysis.
Then, in each experiment, we consider shocks to three parameters to target the growth rate of the size
22The targets for the labor share are 63% and 62%, which correspond to the average labor share in theUSnonfarmbusiness
sector in 1963-1967and 1983-1987, respectively. The targets for the employment rate are 67.7% and 76.4%, which correspond
to the averageUS employment rate of prime-ageworkers in 1963-1967and 1983-1987, respectively. The data is from the BLS.
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of the labor force, output, and wages observed within the 20-year period under study.23 To target the
growth rate of the size of the labor force, we simply impose that L grows at that rate. But to target the
observed growth rate of output and wages within each 20-year period, we consider shocks to alterna-
tive pairs of parameters. For example, one of the pairs of parameters’ shocks we use is (∆zK ,∆zL). In
this case, ∆zK and ∆zL are the necessary shocks to zK and zL that imply growth rates of output and
wages in the model equal to those found in the data within each 20-year period (from 1967 to 1987
or from 1987 to 2007). Finally, the key outcomes of each experiment are the pairs of the necessary
parameters’ shocks that satisfy the targets (for the growth rates of output and wages) and the implied
change of the labor share and employment.
Between 1987 and 2007, in the data, the labor share decreased 3.6% and the prime-age workers
employment rate increased 3.9%. Table 5 shows the results of our experiments for the same period.
Our simplemodel performs remarkably well in two experiments: the combination of shocks to zK and
zL and the combination of shocks to κK and zL. In both experiments, the employment rate increases
slightly more than in the data while the change of the labor share is extremely close to that of its
empirical counterpart. This result adds to the discussion in the previous section: it suggests that a
combination of technological shocks is a good candidate to explain the drop in the labor share and
the simultaneous increase in employment between 1987 and 2007.
We decompose the effects of the shocks to zK and zL in the second and third lines of Table 5. This
decomposition confirms the crucial role played by the automation-augmenting shock (or, quantita-
23The target growth rates are the growth rates of 5-year moving averages. The data is all for the US and was downloaded
from the FRED. The target for the size of the labor force is the civilian labor force (CLF16OV), which grew approximately 55%
in 1967-1987 and 29% in 1987-2007. The target for output, y, is the real output in the nonfarm business sector (henceforth,
NBS). We compute this series as the product of the real output per hour (OPHNFB) and total hours (HOANBS), both in the
NBS. This product grew approximately 101% in both 20-year periods, 1967-1987 and 1987-2007. The target for the wage, w,
is the average wage per worker. To generate this series, we start with the real wage per hour in the NBS. Then, we multiply
this series by the total hours in the NBS (HOANBS) and divide it by civilian employment level (CE16OV). Finally, we adjust by
the deflators: wemultiply this series by the Consumer Price Index (CPIAUCSL) and divide it by the GDP deflator (GDPDEF).
Our series for the average wage grew 32% in 1967-1987 and 42% in 1987-2007.
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Table 5: Targeted Simulations – 1987 to 2007
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
2.85 35.81 – – – -3.22 6.40
2.85 – – – – -15.89 1.01
– 35.81 – – – 11.45 5.84
– 35.96 -5.72 – – -3.26 6.35
– 43.67 – -68.61 – 7.76 18.47
2.73 36.17 – -5.00* – -2.32 7.39
– 42.59 – – 67.70 -5.26 4.16
3.68 33.72 – – -25.00* -2.73 6.93
Note: The experiments regard the period 1987-2007 and all values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns
show the magnitudes of the shocks to the parameters. The shocks marked with an asterisk are exogenously imposed in
the respective experiment. The other shocks are calibrated such that our model targets the growth rates of output and
wages in 1987-2007. The last two columns show the implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively)
as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the data, the labor share fell 3.6% and employment increased 3.9% in
1987-2007.
tively very similar, the negative shock on the relative price of capital) concerning the decrease in the
labor share. The decomposition also highlights the importance of combining ∆zK (or∆κK) and∆zL:
themanual-augmenting shock partially counterbalances the strong negative effect of the automation-
augmenting shock on the labor share. Furthermore, we also conclude that the combination of the
shocks does not have the same effect as the sum of the effects of the shocks. As an outcome of the
transmission mechanism of the model, the interaction of the automation- and manual-augmenting
shocks attenuates the overall impact on the labor share in 1.22 percentage points (which amounts to
about 30% of the total change in the labor share that would result from the two shocks considered sep-
arately). Finally, our decomposition of the effects of ∆zK and ∆zL also contributes to the discussion
of the relative importance of labor- and capital-augmenting technological progress. Recent empir-
ical estimates (using closed-form aggregate production functions) point to net capital-augmenting
technological progress, whereas the usual finding in the literature has been of a net labor-augmenting
technological progress (Jiang and Le´on-Ledesma, 2018, and references therein). Our quantitative re-
sults indicate an alternative scenario: although the size of the labor-augmenting technological shock
outweighs that of the capital-augmenting technological shock, the general-equilibrium effects of the
latter outweigh those of the former.
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Next, we study the role of labormarket institutions. We start by considering the downward trend of
union density reported by Farber et al. (2018), and take this evidence as an indicator that the workers’
bargaining power, φ, may have fallen between 1987 and 2007.24 Yet, our experiments that include the
shock to φ,∆φ, either produce disappointing or quantitatively insignificant results. The worst case is
when we experiment with shocks to both φ and zK because no combination of these shocks reaches
our targets of output and wage growth (and, for this reason, we decided not to report the results in
Table 5). This experiment, therefore, suggests that the combination of (∆zK ,∆φ) is not the underlying
force behind the evolution of output and wages. The results are not as bad when we experiment with
shocks to both φ and zL, but are still inconsistent with the evidence: the combination of ∆φ and∆zL
implies an increase in the labor share and a very large increase in the employment rate. Furthermore,
in this experiment, the model only matches our targets (of output and wage growth) if the workers
lose almost two thirds of their bargaining power, muchmore than the fall in union density reported by
Farber et al. (one third; see also footnote 25 below). Finally, in our last experiment including ∆φ, we
assume that the downward trend of union density led to a fall of 5% of the workers’ bargaining power
and again use ∆zK and ∆zL to reach the targets of output and wage growth.
25 But this experiment
barely changes the shocks to zK and zL thatmatch our targets (for output andwage growth) in the first
experiment. And it only slightly deteriorates the implied changes in the labor share and employment,
suggesting that the combination of productivity shocks continues to be a good candidate to explain
24Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) make a similar assumption to explain the fall in the European labor share.
25 We choose ∆φ = −5% by interpreting φ in our model as a weighted average of the bargaining power of two groups of
workers, those who are and those who are not members of unions. Farber et al. (2018) report that the union density was
on average about 18% in 1983-1987 and 12% in 2003-2007. They also report that the union premium was relatively stable
within this period. Absent any other shock that changes the workers’ bargaining power, we interpret this stability of the
union premium as an indicator that the workers’ bargaining power was also stable for the two groups. This implies that the
weighted average φ only changes due to the distribution of workers between the two groups and not because of a change in
the workers’ bargaining power. Therefore, because φ = 0.5 in our benchmark calibration for 1987, if union members could
capture all thematch surplus, φwould fall 7.3% from 1987 to 2007. Yet, this is the upper bound for at least two reasons. First,
it is rather unlikely that workers capture all the match surplus even if they are union members. Second, Farber et al. report
that unions tend to particularly benefit workers who are less educated and non-white, who seem to have less bargaining
power. Thus, we deviate slightly from the extreme and choose∆φ = −5%.
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the evolution of the US labor share after 1987.
Davis and Haltiwanger (2014) show that the US labor market has become less dynamic: both the
job creation and job destruction rates have decreased in the recent decades. Assuming that this trend
has been caused by changes in labor market institutions, we interpret the declining dynamism of
the US labor market as a simultaneous and proportional drop in the job destruction rate, δL, and
matching efficiency, χ, in our model. Then we conduct three experiments. First, we combine the
shock to zK with the proportional shock to both χ and δL and obtain disappointing results: as in the
case of (∆zK ,∆φ), the algorithm does not converge and, thus, we do not report the results. Second,
we combine the shock to zL with the proportional shock to both χ and δL. In this case, the implied
changes in the labor share and employment are very good. Yet, the model only obtains these results
if the labor market becomes much more dynamic, against the evidence in Davis and Haltiwanger
(2014). Third, we assume that both parameter values decline 25% from 1987 to 2007 and again use the
shocks to zK and zL to reach our targets for the growth rates of output and wages. The results of this
experiment are very similar to those reported in the first line of the same table. This suggests (as in the
experiment in which we assume∆φ = −0.05) that the combination of productivity shocks (∆zK ,∆zL)
has almost the same firepower to explain the evolution of the labor share and employment as in the
experiment without shocks to χ and δL.
We take all these results as indicators that the drop in the labor share in the US after 1987 wasmost
likely caused by a change in technology rather than in labor market institutions, as already hinted by
our results in Section 4.2.
But why did the labor share only start falling after 1987? Why didn’t it fall, for example, between
1967 and 1987?26 To shed some light onwhy the labor share barely changed (in the data) until 1987, we
rerun the experiments reported in Table 5 but for the 20-year period earlier. The results are reported
26The employment rate of prime-age workers increased 12.8% within the same period.
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in Table 6. Our model suggests that all of the observed change of output and wages was caused by a
rise in the productivity of themanual technology. Contrasting this result with the results in Table 5, we
get a clearer picture: the labor share did not fall before 1987 because all of the technological change
in that period improved labor’s productivity; and it started to fall after 1987 because the productivity
of automated technologies accelerated. Indeed, our results point out to a significant acceleration of
automation-augmenting vis-a`-vis manual-augmenting technological change between the two time
periods.27 This acceleration concurs with the estimates in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019). They de-
compose the evolution of the US wage bill before and after 1987, and document significant shifts in
the task content against labor (and towards automation) only after 1987. Bergholt, Furlanetto and
Faccioli (2019) also find evidence pointing to greater automation (especially after 1993) by estimating
a VAR model. The acceleration of automation-augmenting technological change is also in line with
recent empirical estimates based on closed-form aggregate-production functions (see, e.g., Acemoglu
and Restrepo, 2018, and references therein). And it is in line with the evidence on the stock of indus-
trial robots reported by Prettner and Strulik (2017): industrial robots barely existed until 1983 but their
stock grew substantially thereafter.
Table 6: Targeted Simulations – 1967 to 1987
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
-0.04 28.35 – – – 8.97 7.03
-0.04 – – – – 0.14 -0.02
– 28.35 – – – 8.84 7.04
– 28.35 0.09 – – 8.97 7.03
– 28.31 – 0.39 – 8.86 6.92
– 28.30 – – -0.56 9.00 7.06
Note: The experiments regard the period 1967-1987 and all values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns
show the magnitudes of the shocks to the parameters, which are calibrated such that our model targets the growth rates
of output and wages in 1967-1987. The last two columns show the implied change in the labor share and employment
(respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the data, the labor share fell 0.7% and employment increased
12.8% in 1967-1987.
27Alternatively, comparing Tables 5 and 6, themodel also suggests that a fall in the price of capital or a combination of this
with an acceleration of automation-augmenting technological change would explain the fall in the labor share after 1987.
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Finally, we check whether our results are robust to different calibrations of ourmodel by rerunning
the previous experiments in the cases of α = 0.2, α = −0.2, G(z∗) = 0.6, and G(z∗) = 0.4. In broad
terms, our main points stay intact.28 First, the combination of shocks to zK and zL and the combina-
tion of shocks to κK and zL imply reasonable responses of both the labor share and employment in
the period 1987-2007. Second, in the period 1987-2007, if we use changes in labor market institutions
to target output and wage growth, the model continues inconsistent with empirical evidence. Third,
also in the period 1987-2007, assuming reasonable changes in labormarket institutions, the combina-
tion of shocks to zK and zL continues to generate reasonable results. And fourth, themodel continues
to suggest the acceleration of automation-augmenting technological change from 1967-1987 to 1987-
2007.
5 Other Results – The Effect of Alternative Assumptions
In this section, we compare the results of three alternative versions of our model with those of our
model in Section 2. We reach three conclusions. First, although changes in labor market institutions
do not seem to explain the evolution of the US labor share, our model requires labor market insti-
tutions (in particular, wage bargaining) to fit the US evidence after 1967. Second, if entry costs are
proportional to output, our model continues to point to the acceleration of automation-augmenting
technological change after 1987. Third, if the cutoff, z∗, is exogenously set, our model continues to
suggest that an automation-augmenting shock raises employment.
5.1 Are Labor Market Institutions Relevant for theModel’s Mechanism?
The results in this paper suggest that changes in labormarket institutions play aminor role in explain-
ing the drop in the labor share. But, in this section, we show that labor market institutions are crucial
28For the full results, see Appendix B.
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for our model’s mechanism and results. We make this clear by considering a version of our model in
which firms and workers do not bargain wages; instead, workers obtain a constant fraction of firm’s
output: w(z) = φnb zL(z). Using this version of our model, we rerun the exercises of Sections 4.2 and
4.3.29 This version of ourmodel cannot account for the drop in the labor share between 1987 and 2007.
Moreover, under shocks to productivity and the cost of capital, this model only matches the targets for
output and wage growth for the period 1967-1987 if it allows for a strong regression of the automated
technology (a drop in zK) or a strong rise in the cost of capital (an increase in κK). Both predictions
seem difficult to justify empirically for that period. Thus, we conclude that the consideration of a la-
bor market institution like wage bargaining is crucial for the dynamics of our model to be in line with
those suggested by the empirical literature.
5.2 Constant Entry Costs vs. Constant Entry Costs-To-Output Ratio
In Section 4.3, we focus on time spans of 20 years. In such a time span, it may be expected that entry
costs, Ω, are not fixed but tend to grow as the overall economy also grows (Bollard, Klenow and Li,
2016). Therefore, in this section, we test whether our results hold in a setting where entry costs are a
constant proportion of output: Ω ≡ ωy. Using this version of our model, we rerun the experiments of
Sections 4.2 and 4.3.30
We conclude that our main results in Section 4.3 hold. This version of our model continues to
suggest that the change in the US labor share was most likely caused by technological changes rather
than by changes in labor market institutions. And it continues to hint that the US labor share only
falls after 1987 because of an acceleration of automation-augmenting technological change. Yet, this
29We report the full results in Tables C1-C3 in the Appendix C. In all these experiments, we use our benchmark calibration
(as detailed in Table 1) except for φ, which is replaced by φnb. We calibrate κL as implied by the respective exercises using
the version of our model in Section 2. For example, we use the same value of κL to generate the results reported in Tables
2 and C1. Finally, we calibrate φnb together with zL, zK , and χ to satisfy our targets for employment, the labor share, labor
market tightness, and the proportion of firms that use the manual technology.
30We report the full results in Tables D1-D3 in the Appendix D. In all these experiments, we use our benchmark calibration
and calibrate ω such that Ω = ωy = 1.
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version of our model implies different results from those we obtain in Section 4.2. If Ω = ωy, a change
in a parameter that affects output, y, also affects the entry cost, ωy. Thus, the elasticities we report in
Table D1 combine two effects: the effect of the (‘pure’) elasticity reported in Table 2 and the effect of
the implied change in the entry cost. In this context, and contrary to our previous results, we find that
automation-augmenting technological change slightly reduces employment and the average wage.
The (implied) increase in the entry cost discourages entry. As result, the reallocation effect (towards
the automated technology) dominates the aggregate effect (of greater firm entry), implying the fall in
employment.
This result, however, builds on the extreme assumption that entry costs grow proportionally to
output, whichmay be unreasonable as suggested by the evidence in Bento (2014) and Bollard, Klenow
and Li (2016). The empirical estimates in Bento rely on large cross-country data sets and point to a
negative (partial) correlation between entry costs as a percentage of output per worker and both TFP
and output per worker. In time-horizons of 15 years, Bollard, Klenow and Li find similar results using
time-series data of the present discounted value of profits as a proxy for entry costs. Thus, both studies
indicate that entry costs grow less than proportionally with output per worker, which is consistent
with our model in Section 2.31 Contrasting the elasticities of our model assuming constant Ω (in Table
2) with those of the model assuming Ω ≡ ωy (in Table D1), we can see that the elasticity of n with
respect to zK is much higher (in absolute terms) in the former than in the latter. Therefore, if we
consider that these versions of our model are the extremes and reality is somewhere in the middle,
then our experiments continue to suggest that automation-augmenting technological change very
likely increases employment.
31Our starting assumption of a constant entry cost,Ω, ensures that countries more technologically advanced enjoy greater
(aggregate) output per worker, y/n, and lower ratio of entry costs to output per worker, Ω/(y/n).
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5.3 Technological vs. Economical Cutoff
In ourmodel, the cutoff, z∗, is economical in the sense that it is the level of the productivity draw, z, for
which firms are indifferent between the two technologies, manual and automated. In the literature,
however, somemodels embed a technological cutoff: in this case, technological constraints stop some
firms from adopting (or some tasks from being executed using) the automated technology. This is the
case of the model in Martinez (2018), in which firms would like to use machines for all tasks but, due
to technological constraints, are forced to also use labor. On the other hand, Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2018) build a model with both an economical and a technological cutoff but in which only one binds.
In this section, we follow Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), and assume that technological con-
straints make it unfeasible for some firms to adopt the automated technology. We denote this cut-
off as z∗∗, meaning that only firms with a productivity draw above z∗∗ may choose the automated
technology. To make this case relevant for our analysis, we focus on the scenario of z∗∗ > z∗. These
assumptions simplify our model. Because we set the cutoff exogenously, we drop Eq. (3) from our list
of equations. Then we find θ and w(z) using the following free-entry condition, instead of Eq. (4),
∫ z∗∗
zmin
(
βJL(z)−
κL
µ(θ)
)
dG(z) +
∫
∞
z∗∗
(JK(z) − κK) dG(z) = Ω, (16)
and the wage equation, Eq. (8).
Using this version of ourmodel, we still conclude that an automation-augmenting shock increases
employment. Because the cutoff does not move, this version of our model mutes the reallocation
effect but keeps the aggregate effect. Mechanically, a rise in zK increases the left-hand side of Eq. (16),
whichmust be compensated by an equal fall also on the left-hand side becauseΩ is constant. Because
w(z) is directly reduced by zK , a rise in zK must increase θ and, thus, employment.
We can also use this version of our model to obtain insights about an automation shock repre-
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sented by a fall in z∗∗. In Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), a shock that makes it feasible for a greater
proportion of firms to use the automated technology reduces employment. In our model, we find the
opposite result. If z∗∗ drops when z∗∗ > z∗, then the left-hand side of Eq. (16) must increase. And by
the same logic as for the shock in zK , θ and employment must rise for the economy to reach the new
equilibrium.
6 Concluding Remarks
The labor share has been falling throughout the world. This phenomenon contradicts the much cele-
brated Kaldor Facts and led many researchers to come forward with theories and evidence to explain
it. There are two prominent groups within this literature: those that ascribe the fall in the labor share
to technological evolution and those that ascribe it to changes in labor market institutions. In this
paper, we build a theoretical model to delve into this issue, which we think is a good starting point to
contrast the role of automation with that of labor market institutions in explaining the evolution of
the labor share. In our model, firms choose between two technologies: an automated technology and
a manual technology. If they choose the automated one, they only employ capital. If they choose the
manual one, they only employ labor and behave similarly to firms in the standard DMPmodel.
Our model suggests that labor market institutions play an almost insignificant role in explaining
the fall in the labor share. On the contrary, technological shocks have a huge power to induce fluc-
tuations in the labor share. Furthermore, we have inquired into the causes of the relatively stagnant
US labor share in 1967-1987 and the falling US labor share in 1987-2007. Our model suggests that the
fall in the labor share coincided with an acceleration of automation-augmenting technological change
(which is consistent with the evidence and estimates in Acemoglu andRestrepo (2018, 2019), Bergholt,
Furlanetto and Faccioli (2019), and Prettner and Strulik (2017)).
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In this paper, we also offer insights on how automation shapes employment and wages. In our
model, an automation-augmenting technological change induces two effects. First, the increased
profitability of the automation technology reallocates resources towards this technology, displacing
labor. Second, ourmodel suggests that the shock induces greater firmentry as an aggregate-equilibrium
result. This aggregate effect benefits labor and outweighs the reallocation effect, implying, again, that
ourmodel concurs with the empirical evidence (see Autor and Salomons, 2018 andGregory, Salomons
and Zierahn, 2018).
Our paper also contributes to the public debate on the introduction of a robot tax. In light of
our model, a robot tax can be interpreted as one (or as a combination) of two shocks: or (i) as a tax
on the returns of the automated technology, which is equivalent to a fall in its productivity, zK ; or
(ii) as a tax on the (startup) cost of capital, which is equivalent to a rise in κK . We have shown that
both scenarios increase the labor share in the model. But we have also shown that both scenarios
reduce wages and employment. Thus, our model suggests that policymakers face a trade-off: if they
introduce a robot tax, they reduce inequality between workers and firms’ owners but they also reduce
the workers’ (absolute) standard of living.
Wehave chosen to build a simplemodel, which comeswith the benefit of analytical tractability and
the ensuing clarity of themechanisms at play in the model. But, even though our model also provides
insightful results that are broadly consistent with the evidence, its abstractions are naturally open to
criticism. Wehavepointed out a fewof those simplifying abstractions over the previous sections. Here,
we discuss how some abstractions of the model may shape the way productivity-augmenting shocks
affect employment. Our model suggests that if productivity continuously rises, employment should
continuously increase and, therefore, asymptotically there should be full employment. This seems
unrealistic and clashes with the evidence that theUS prime-ageworkers’ employment rate is currently
below that observed in the late 1990s. There are, however, a few abstractions in our model that if
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alleviated could improve the flexibility of its results. One is that entry costs may increase with output
(even if less thanproportionally), undermining the effect of productivity on employment aswe discuss
in Section 5.2. Another is that labor supply decisions – decisions on labor force participation and job
search effort – may matter.32 In our model, there is full labor force participation and nonemployed
workers always supply the same job search effort. In reality, however, workers change their labor force
attachment and the amount of time they search for jobs as economic conditions change. As a result,
in the presence of high income and wealth effects, workers may prefer to reduce their labor supply
because they feel richer when productivity rises. In this case, employment would fall not due to lower
labor demand but rather due to low labor supply.
We end this paper with some considerations for future research. We have just discussed endo-
geneizing labor supply in the model but there are a number of other extensions that could be consid-
ered. One is to build a model that distinguishes between workers of different skill levels. In this con-
text, machines could be complementary to high-skill labor and substitute low-skill labor as in Cords
and Prettner (2019). This model would offer insights on, for example, wage premium and how au-
tomation affects the employment of workers of different skill levels. Another extension is to build a
model in which labor and capital are complementary at the firm level but firms can adjust the elas-
ticity of output with respect to the automated technology. As we have discussed in Section 4.2, such
a model would likely strengthen the role of changes in labor market institutions as they induce firms
to adjust the elasticity with respect to the automated technology (similar to Caballero and Hammour,
1998). Finally, we can also change the timing of the model. In the model of this paper, firms choose
technology at the time of entry (either manual or automated). But we can envision a model in which
all firms start as manual and may change to the automated technology later on depending on the
incentives (similar to Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018). In such a model, automation replaces existing
32Indeed, labor force participation among US prime-age workers has fallen since the late 1990s; see Daly et al. (2018) for a
recent discussion of this evidence.
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labor, whichmay affect how the automation-augmenting technological shock unfolds in the economy.
We will consider the implications of this extension in a future paper.
References
Acemoglu, Daron. 2003. “Labor- and Capital-Augmenting Technical Change.” Journal of European
Economic Association, 1: 1–37.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2001. “Productivity Differences.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 116 (2): 563–606.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Pascual Restrepo. 2018. “The Race between Man and Machine: Implica-
tions of Technology for Growth, Factor Shares, and Employment.” American Economic Review,
108(6): 1488–1542.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Pascual Restrepo. 2019. “Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Dis-
places and Reinstates Labor.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(2): 3–30.
Alesina, A.,M. Battisti, and J. Zeira. 2018. “Technology and Labor Regulations: Theory and Evidence.”
Journal of Economic Growth, 23(1): 41–78.
Alvarez-Cuadrado, Francisco, Ngo Van Long, and Markus Poschke. 2018. “Capital-Labor Substitu-
tion, Structural Change, and the Labor Income Share.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
87: 206–231.
Autor, David, and Anna Salomons. 2018. “Is Automation Labor Share–Displacing? Productivity
Growth, Employment, and the Labor Share.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1–63.
Autor, David, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson, and John Van Reenen. 2017a.
“Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share.” American Economic Review, 107(5): 180–85.
46 GUIMARA˜ES & GIL
Autor, David, DavidDorn, Lawrence F Katz, ChristinaPatterson, and John VanReenen. 2017b. “The
Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms.” National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper 23396.
Benhabib, Jess, Jesse Perla, and Christopher Tonetti. 2017. “Reconciling Models of Diffusion and
Innovation: A Theory of the Productivity Distribution and Technology Frontier.” National Bureau of
Economic ResearchWorking Paper 23095.
Bental, Benjamin, and DominiqueDemougin. 2010. “Declining Labor Shares and Bargaining Power:
An Institutional Explanation.” Journal of Macroeconomics, 32(1): 443 – 456.
Bentolila, S., and G. Saint-Paul. 2003. “Explaining Movements in the Labor Share.” B.E. Journal of
Macroeconomics, Contributions, 3(1): article 9.
Bento, Pedro. 2014. “Niche Firms, Mass Markets, and Income Across Countries: Accounting for the
Impact of Entry Costs.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 48: 147 – 158.
Berg, Andrew, Edward F. Buffie, and Luis-Felipe Zanna. 2018. “Should we fear the robot revolution?
(The correct answer is yes).” Journal of Monetary Economics, 97: 117 – 148.
Bergholt, Drago, Francesco Furlanetto, and Nicolo` Faccioli. 2019. “The Decline of the Labor Share:
New Empirical Evidence.”
Berthold, N., R. Fehn, and E. Thode. 2002. “Falling Labor Share andRising Unemployment: Long-Run
Consequences of Institutional Shocks?” German Economic Review, 3(4): 431–459.
Blanchard, O. 1997. “The Medium Run.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 89–141.
Blanchard, Olivier, and Francesco Giavazzi. 2003. “Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Dereg-
ulation in Goods and Labor Markets.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3): 879–907.
Bollard, Albert, Peter J Klenow, andHuiyu Li. 2016. “Entry Costs Rise with Development.”
Caballero, Ricardo J., and Mohamad L. Hammour. 1998. “Jobless Growth: Appropriability, Factor
Substitution, and Unemployment.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 48: 51 –
EXPLAINING THE LABOR SHARE 47
94.
Caselli, Francesco, andWilbur JohnColeman. 2006. “TheWorld Technology Frontier.” American Eco-
nomic Review, 96(3): 499–522.
Coles, Melvyn G., and Ali Moghaddasi Kelishomi. 2018. “Do Job Destruction Shocks Matter in the
Theory of Unemployment?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 10(3): 118–36.
Cords, Dario, and Klaus Prettner. 2019. “Technological Unemployment Revisited: Automation in a
Search andMatching Framework.”
Daly, Mary C, Joseph H Pedtke, Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau, and Annemarie Schweinert. 2018. “Why
Aren’t USWorkers Working?” FRBSF Economic Letter, 24.
Dao, M.C., M. Das, Z. Koczan, and W. Lian. 2017. “Why Is Labor Receiving a Smaller Share of Global
Income? Theory and Empirical Evidence.” IMFWorking Paper 17/169.
Davis, Steven J, and John Haltiwanger. 2014. “Labor Market Fluidity and Economic Performance.”
National Bureau of Economic ResearchWorking Paper 20479.
Eggertsson, Gauti B., Jacob A. Robbins, and Ella Getz Wold. 2018. “Kaldor and Piketty’s Facts: The
Rise of Monopoly Power in the United States.”NBER Working Paper Series, 24287.
Elsby,MichaelWL,BartHobijn, andAys¸egu¨l S¸ahin. 2013. “TheDecline of theUSLabor Share.”Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity, 2013(2): 1–63.
Fadinger, Harald, and Karin Mayr. 2014. “Skill-Biased Technological Change, Unemployment, and
Brain Drain.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 12(2): 397–431.
Farber, Henry S., Daniel Herbst, Ilyana Kuziemko, and Suresh Naidu. 2018. “Unions and Inequal-
ity Over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data.” National Bureau of Economic
ResearchWorking Paper 24587.
Ghironi, Fabio, and Marc J. Melitz. 2005. “International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynamics with
Heterogeneous Firms.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3): 865–915.
48 GUIMARA˜ES & GIL
Gomes, Pedro, and Zoe¨ Kuehn. 2017. “Human Capital and the Size Distribution of Firms.” Review of
Economic Dynamics, 26: 164 – 179.
Gregory, Terry, Anna Salomons, and Ulrich Zierahn. 2018. “Racing With or Against the Machine?
Evidence from Europe.”
Growiec, Jakub. 2008. “A New Class of Production Functions and an Argument Against Purely Labour-
Augmenting Technical Change.” International Journal of Economic Theory, 4: 483–502.
Growiec, Jakub. 2013. “A Microfoundation for Normalized CES Production Functions with Factor-
Augmenting Technical Change.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 37: 2336–2350.
Growiec, Jakub. 2017. “Factor-Specific Technology Choice.” Narodowy Bank Polski Working Papers,
Economic Research Department,, 265.
Growiec, Jakub, PeterMcAdam, and JakubMuck. 2018. “Endogenous Labor Share Cycles: Theory and
Evidence.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 87: 74–93.
Hall, Robert E., and Paul R. Milgrom. 2008. “The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage
Bargain.” American Economic Review, 98(4): 1653–1674.
Hopenhayn, Hugo, JulianNeira, and Rish Singhania. 2018. “From Population Growth to FirmDemo-
graphics: Implications for Concentration, Entrepreneurship and the Labor Share.” National Bureau
of Economic ResearchWorking Paper 25382.
Hornstein, Andreas, Per Krusell, and Giovanni L. Violante. 2007. “Technology-Policy Interaction in
Frictional Labour-Markets.” The Review of Economic Studies, 74(4): 1089–1124.
Jiang, Wei, and Miguel Le´on-Ledesma. 2018. “Variable Markups and Capital-Labor Substitution.”
Economics Letters, 171: 34–36.
Jones, Charles I. 2003. “Growth, Capital Shares, and a New Perspective on Production Functions.” UC
Berkeley mimeo.
EXPLAINING THE LABOR SHARE 49
Jones, Charles I. 2005. “The Shape of Production Functions and the Direction of Technical Change.”
Quartely Journal of Economics, 120 (2): 517–549.
Jones, Charles I., and Paul M. Romer. 2010. “The New Kaldor Facts: Ideas, Institutions, Population,
and Human Capital.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(1): 224–245.
Kaldor, N. 1961. “The Theory of Capital.” , ed. F. A. Lutz and D. C. Hague, Chapter Capital Accumula-
tion and Economic Growth, 177–222. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Karabarbounis, Loukas, andBrentNeiman. 2014. “TheGlobal Decline of the Labor Share.” TheQuar-
terly Journal of Economics, 129(1): 61–103.
Leo´n-Ledesma,Miguel A, andMathan Satchi. 2019. “Appropriate Technology and BalancedGrowth.”
The Review of Economic Studies, 86(2): 807–835.
Ljungqvist, Lars, and Thomas J Sargent. 2018. Recursive Macroeconomic Theory.MIT press.
Luttmer, ErzoG. J. 2007. “Selection, Growth, and the Size Distribution of Firms.” TheQuarterly Journal
of Economics, 122(3): 1103–1144.
Martinez, Joseba. 2018. “Automation, Growth and Factor Shares.”
Melitz, Marc J. 2003. “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry
Productivity.” Econometrica, 71(6): 1695–1725.
Oberfield, Ezra, and Devesh Raval. 2014. “Micro Data and Macro Technology.” NBER Working Paper
No. 20452.
Peretto, Pietro, and John Seater. 2013. “Factor-Eliminating Technical Change.” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 60: 459–473.
Petrongolo, Barbara, and Christopher A. Pissarides. 2001. “Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of
the Matching Function.” Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2): 390–431.
Pissarides, Christopher. 2000. EquilibriumUnemployment Theory. Cambridge:MIT Press.
50 GUIMARA˜ES & GIL
Pissarides, Christopher A. 2009. “The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the An-
swer?” Econometrica.
Prettner, Klaus, and Holger Strulik. 2017. “The Lost Race Against the Machine: Automation, Educa-
tion, and Inequality in an R&D-based Growth Model.”
Shimer, Robert. 2005. “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies.” Ameri-
can Economic Review, 95(1): 24–49.
Shimer, Robert. 2012. “Reassessing the Ins and Outs of Unemployment.” Review of Economic Dynam-
ics, 15(2): 127–148.
Young, A. T., and H. Zuleta. 2018. “Do Unions Increase Labor’s Shares? Evidence from US Industry-
Level Data.” Eastern Economic Journal, 44(4): 558–575.
Zeira, Joseph. 1998. “Workers, Machines and Economic Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
113: 1091–1113.
Zeira, Joseph. 2010. “Machines as Engines of Growth.” mimeo.
Zuleta, Hernando. 2008. “Factor Saving Innovations and Factor Income Shares.” Review of Economic
Dynamics, 11: 836–851.
EXPLAINING THE LABOR SHARE 51
A Analytical Derivations
For Online Publication
A.1 Derivation of θˆ
In this appendix, we show how we obtain Eq. (13). Using the definition of f(θ) and µ(θ) in Eqs. (3,
assuming α = 0) and (12) imply
w = (1− φ)b+ φ(zL + θκL)− φ
[(
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
− κK
)[
(β − 1)χθ1−η + 1− β(1− δL)
]]
,
β
zL − w
1− β(1− δL)
−
κL
χθ−η
=
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
− κK .
Using hats to denote log-linear variables, we log-linearize the two equations above assuming that only
zK and the endogenous variables vary after the shock to zK :
wwˆ = φθκLθˆ − φ
[
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
[
(β − 1)χθ1−η + 1− β(1− δL)
]]
(zˆK + zˆ∗) +
−(1− η)φ
[(
zKz
∗
1− β(1 − δK)
− κK
)
(β − 1)χθ1−η
]
θˆ,
−β
1
1− β(1 − δL)
wwˆ − η
κLθ
η
χ
θˆ =
zKz
∗
1− β(1 − δK)
(zˆK + zˆ∗).
Defining C ≡
[
zKz
∗
1−β(1−δK )
[
(β − 1)χθ1−η + 1− β(1− δL)
]]
and
D ≡ (1− η)
[(
zKz
∗
1−β(1−δK)
− κK
)
(β − 1)χθ1−η
]
, we replace the first equation in the second one:
− β
1
1− β(1− δL)
[
φ(θκL −D)θˆ − φC(zˆK + zˆ∗)
]
− η
κLθ
η
χ
θˆ =
zKz
∗
1− β(1 − δK)
(zˆK + zˆ∗)⇔
θˆ
(
β
φ(D − θκL)
1− β(1 − δL)
− η
κLθ
η
χ
)
=
(
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
− β
φC
1− β(1− δL)
)
(zˆK + zˆ∗). (A.1)
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Using the definition of C, we rearrange the term on the right-hand side of Eq. (A.1) to
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
− β
φ
1− β(1− δL)
[
zKz
∗
1− β(1 − δK)
[
(β − 1)χθ1−η + 1− β(1− δL)
]]
=
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
(
1− βφ+ βφ
(1− β)χθ1−η
1− β(1− δL)
)
≡ A > 0.
Using the definition ofD, we rearrange the term on the left-hand side of Eq. (A.1) to
φβ
(1 − η)
(
zKz
∗
1−β(1−δK)
− κK
)
(β − 1)χθ1−η − θκL
1− β(1 − δL)
− η
κLθ
η
χ
=
−

φβ (1 − β)(1− η)
(
zKz
∗
1−β(1−δK )
− κK
)
χθ1−η + θκL
1− β(1− δL)
+ η
κLθ
η
χ

 ≡ B < 0.
Using the definitions of A andB in Eq. (A.1), we obtain Eq. (13).
A.2 Derivation of the Elasticity of z∗ with Respect to zK
In this appendix, we show how to obtain the elasticity of z∗ with respect to zK without assuming any
distribution of productivity draws and any value of α. As in Footnote 14, we denote jL(z) ≡ zL(z) −
w(z). This notation allows us to rewrite the free-entry condition, Eq. (4), as
(1−G(z∗))
(
zK
1
1−G(z∗)
∫
∞
z∗
zdG(z)
1− β(1− δK)
− κK
)
+G(z∗)

β 1G(z∗)
∫ z∗
zmin
jL(z)dG(z)
1− β(1− δL)
−
κL
µ(θ)

 = Ω.
Next we replace κL
µ(θ) using the no-arbitrage condition, Eq. (3):
(1−G(z∗))
(
zK
1
1−G(z∗)
∫
∞
z∗
zdG(z)
1− β(1− δK)
− κK
)
+
+G(z∗)

β 1G(z∗)
∫ z∗
zmin
jL(z)dG(z)
1− β(1− δL)
+
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
− κK − β
jL(z
∗)
1− β(1− δL)

 = Ω.
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Assuming that δK = δL = δ, without much loss of generality, and after some rearrangements, we
obtain
zK
(∫
∞
z∗
zdG(z) + z∗G(z∗)
)
+ β
(∫ z∗
zmin
jL(z)dG(z) − jL(z
∗)G(z∗)
)
= (Ω + κK)[1 − β(1 − δ)]. (A.2)
Eq. (A.2) nests Eq. (14). To see this, note that, if zL(z) = zL (α = 0), then jL(z) is the same for all z.
Thus the second term on the left-hand side of Eq. (A.2) is zero and we obtain Eq. (14).
Using the Leibniz rule, the log-linearization of Eq. (A.2) implies:
zK
(∫
∞
z∗
zdG(z) + z∗G(z∗)
)
zˆK + zKz
∗G(z∗)zˆ∗ − β
∫ z∗
zmin
j′L(z
∗)g(z)dzz∗ zˆ∗ = 0⇔
zˆ∗
zˆK
= −
zK
(∫
∞
z∗
zdG(z) + z∗G(z∗)
)
zKz∗G(z∗)− βz∗
∫ z∗
zmin
j′L(z
∗)g(z)dz
, (A.3)
where j′L(z) denotes the derivative of jL(z) with respect to z. If α = 0, note that j
′
L(z
∗) = 0. Thus, in
this case, the second term in the denominator of Eq. (A.3) is 0, and we obtain Eq. (15).
B Targeted Simulations – Sensitivity Analysis
For Online Publication
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Table B1: Scenario α = 0.2 – 1987 to 2007
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
1.24 37.13 – – – -3.77 5.79
1.24 – – – – -65.84 0.46
– 37.13 – – – 28.45 5.70
– 37.23 -2.49 – – -3.80 5.77
– 39.19 – -27.07 – 0.59 10.67
1.25 37.45 – -5.00* – -2.83 6.82
– 41.25 – – 54.07 -4.82 4.64
1.50 35.70 – – -25.00* -3.48 6.11
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1987-2007 using our baseline model calibrated with α = 0.2. All
values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes of the shocks to the parameters. The
shocks marked with an asterisk are exogenously imposed in the respective experiment. The other shocks are calibrated
such that our model targets the growth rates of output and wages within 1987-2007. The last two columns show the
implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the data,
the labor share fell 3.6% and employment increased 3.9% in 1987-2007.
Table B2: Scenario α = 0.2 – 1967 to 1987
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
1.13 28.30 – – – 8.74 6.81
1.13 – – – – -27.14 0.27
– 28.30 – – – 24.78 6.68
– 28.36 -2.36 – – 8.71 6.78
– 33.38 – -47.63 – 22.22 20.05
– 30.01 – – 23.40 7.98 6.06
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1967-1987 using our baseline model calibrated with α = 0.2. All
values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes of the shocks to the parameters, which
are calibrated such that ourmodel targets the growth rates of output andwages in 1967-1987. The last two columns show
the implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the
data, the labor share fell 0.7% and employment increased 12.8% in 1967-1987.
Table B3: Scenario α = −0.2 – 1987 to 2007
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
4.35 34.64 – – – -2.57 7.11
4.35 – – – – -12.14 1.61
– 34.64 – – – 8.95 6.18
– 34.76 -8.72 – – -2.61 7.07
– 40.97 – -59.18 – 6.45 17.03
4.10 35.03 – -5.00* – -1.72 8.05
– 43.79 – – 76.47 -5.85 3.50
5.77 31.90 – – -25.00* -1.86 7.89
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1987-2007 using our baseline model calibrated with α = −0.2.
All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes of the shocks to the parameters. The
shocks marked with an asterisk are exogenously imposed in the respective experiment. The other shocks are calibrated
such that our model targets the growth rates of output and wages within 1987-2007. The last two columns show the
implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the data,
the labor share fell 3.6% and employment increased 3.9% in 1987-2007.
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Table B4: Scenario α = −0.2 – 1967 to 1987
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
-1.41 28.44 – – – 9.24 7.30
-1.41 – – – – 2.35 -0.58
– 28.44 – – – 7.05 7.67
– 28.43 3.13 – – 9.25 7.31
– 27.58 – 7.06 – 7.27 5.36
– 26.86 – – -13.80 10.16 8.20
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1967-1987using our baselinemodel calibratedwith α = −0.2. All
values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes of the shocks to the parameters, which
are calibrated such that ourmodel targets the growth rates of output andwages in 1967-1987. The last two columns show
the implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the
data, the labor share fell 0.7% and employment increased 12.8% in 1967-1987.
Table B5: ScenarioG(z∗) = 0.6 – 1987 to 2007
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
4.69 33.87 – – – -2.24 7.47
4.69 – – – – -14.61 1.75
– 33.87 – – – 11.30 6.58
– 34.11 -9.43 – – -2.31 7.39
– 41.30 – -68.88 – 8.25 19.01
4.49 34.22 – -5.00* – -1.39 8.42
– 43.82 – – 70.94 -5.93 3.42
6.14 30.82 – – -25.00* -1.45 8.35
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1987-2007 using our baseline model calibrated by imposing
G(z∗) = 0.6 in steady-state. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes of the
shocks to the parameters. The shocks marked with an asterisk are exogenously imposed in the respective experiment.
The other shocks are calibrated such that our model targets the growth rates of output and wages within 1987-2007. The
last two columns show the implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to
the parameters. In the data, the labor share fell 3.6% and employment increased 3.9% in 1987-2007.
Table B6: ScenarioG(z∗) = 0.6 – 1967 to 1987
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
-0.58 27.57 – – – 9.86 7.91
-0.58 – – – – 1.07 -0.23
– 27.57 – – – 8.90 8.04
– 27.56 1.32 – – 9.87 7.92
– 27.23 – 3.13 – 8.98 7.04
– 26.93 – – -4.86 10.24 8.28
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1967-1987 using our baseline model calibrated by imposing
G(z∗) = 0.6 in steady-state. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes of the
shocks to the parameters, which are calibrated such that ourmodel targets the growth rates of output and wages in 1967-
1987. The last two columns show the implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the
shocks to the parameters. In the data, the labor share fell 0.7% and employment increased 12.8% in 1967-1987.
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Table B7: ScenarioG(z∗) = 0.4 – 1987 to 2007
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
1.62 37.39 – – – -3.83 5.72
1.62 – – – – -16.74 0.56
– 37.39 – – – 11.57 5.41
– 37.46 -3.24 – – -3.85 5.70
– 45.51 – -68.25 – 7.42 18.10
1.55 37.75 – -5.00* – -2.90 6.74
– 41.82 – – 66.31 -4.97 4.47
2.07 36.03 – – -25.00* -3.56 6.02
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1987-2007 using our baseline model calibrated by imposing
G(z∗) = 0.4 in steady-state. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes of the
shocks to the parameters. The shocks marked with an asterisk are exogenously imposed in the respective experiment.
The other shocks are calibrated such that our model targets the growth rates of output and wages within 1987-2007. The
last two columns show the implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to
the parameters. In the data, the labor share fell 3.6% and employment increased 3.9% in 1987-2007.
Table B8: ScenarioG(z∗) = 0.4 – 1967 to 1987
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
0.08 29.04 – – – 8.40 6.47
0.08 – – – – -0.47 0.03
– 29.04 – – – 8.83 6.46
– 29.04 -0.16 – – 8.40 6.47
– 29.16 – -1.20 – 8.77 6.83
– 29.14 – – 1.68 8.36 6.43
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1967-1987 using our baseline model calibrated by imposing
G(z∗) = 0.4 in steady-state. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes of the
shocks to the parameters, which are calibrated such that ourmodel targets the growth rates of output and wages in 1967-
1987. The last two columns show the implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the
shocks to the parameters. In the data, the labor share fell 0.7% and employment increased 12.8% in 1967-1987.
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C The Results of the Model withoutWage Bargaining
For Online Publication
Table C1: Model without bargain – Elasticities
∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆w ∆z∗
∆zK 7.24 -4.51 2.40 0.00 -2.55
∆zL 1.57 0.28 0.85 1.00 0.00
∆κK -2.72 1.75 -1.01 0.00 1.21
∆κL -0.24 0.00 -0.24 0.00 0.00
∆b 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆φnb -6.14 1.00 -6.14 1.00 0.00
∆χ 0.48 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.00
∆δL -0.75 -0.29 -1.04 0.00 0.00
Note: This table shows the effects of the shocks to the parameters using our model without bargaining, as explained
in Section 5.1. All values refer to percentage changes and all shocks are of 1%. Thus, the values in this table may be
interpreted as elasticities. In the first column, we write the respective source of the shock. In the remaining columns, we
write the elasticities of output, labor share, employment, average wages, and cutoff.
Table C2: Model without bargain – 1987 to 2007
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φnb ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
0.69 41.71 – – – 6.50 17.09
0.69 – – – – -2.94 1.69
– 41.71 – – – 8.98 16.72
– 41.71 -1.48 – – 6.47 17.05
– 43.43 – -1.20 – 7.95 18.68
-2.80 49.17 – -5.00* – 11.05 22.09
– 41.70 – – 33.38 1.43 11.44
1.82 41.71 – – -25.00* 8.62 19.41
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1987-2007 using our model without bargaining, as explained
in Section 5.1. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes of the shocks to
the parameters. The shocks marked with an asterisk are exogenously imposed in the respective experiment. The other
shocks are calibrated such that our model targets the growth rates of output and wages within 1987-2007. The last two
columns show the implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the
parameters. In the data, the labor share fell 3.6% and employment increased 3.9% in 1987-2007. See Section 4.3 formore
details on the experiments.
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Table C3: Model without bargain – 1967 to 1987
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φnb ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
-4.42 31.59 – – – 15.96 13.90
-4.42 – – – – 10.98 -8.33
– 31.59 – – – 6.66 17.12
– 31.59 10.92 – – 16.15 14.08
– 28.31 – 2.56 – 8.80 6.87
– 31.59 – – 76.33 -8.13 -9.76
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1967-1987 using our model without bargaining, as explained in
Section 5.1. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes of the shocks to the
parameters, which are calibrated such that our model targets the growth rates of output and wages in 1967-1987. The
last two columns show the implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to
the parameters. In the data, the labor share fell 0.7% and employment increased 12.8% in 1967-1987. See Section 4.3 for
more details on the experiments.
D The Results of the Model withΩ = ωy
For Online Publication
Table D1: Elasticities of the Model with Ω = ωy
∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆w ∆z∗
∆zK 1.40 -1.50 -0.05 -0.07 -0.74
∆zL 0.31 0.86 0.15 1.02 0.38
∆κK -0.63 0.72 0.04 0.05 0.45
∆κL -0.05 -0.09 -0.14 0.00 -0.06
∆b -0.18 -0.17 -0.51 0.17 -0.22
∆φ -0.08 -0.07 -0.22 0.07 -0.10
∆χ 0.10 0.18 0.27 0.00 0.12
∆δL -0.03 -0.45 -0.36 -0.12 -0.03
Note: This table shows the effects of the shocks to the parameters using our model with proportional entry costs, as
explained in Section 5.2. All values refer to percentage changes and all shocks are of 1%. Thus, the values in this table
may be interpreted as elasticities. In the first column, we write the respective source of the shock. In the remaining
columns, we write the elasticities of output, labor share, employment, average wages, and cutoff.
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Table D2: Model with Ω = ωy – 1987-2007
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
30.03 43.01 – – – -5.50 3.89
30.03 – – – – -38.68 -3.63
– 43.01 – – – 22.90 4.35
– 44.38 -61.27 – – -6.02 3.32
– 64.99 – -96.27 – 12.29 23.45
29.77 43.38 – -5.00* – -4.55 4.94
– 33.55** – – -96.61** 24.56** 31.81**
31.65 39.08 – – -25.00* -4.24 5.27
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1987-2007 using our model with proportional entry costs, as
explained in Section 5.2. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes of the
shocks to the parameters. The shocks marked with an asterisk are exogenously imposed in the respective experiment.
The other shocks are calibrated such that our model targets the growth rates of output and wages in 1987-2007. The last
two columns show the implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the
parameters. In the data, the labor share fell 3.6% and employment increased 3.9% in 1987-2007. See Section 4.3 formore
details on the experiments. Note that the algorithm that runs our simulations is unable to converge in the experiment
considered in the seventh line (the values are marked with double asterisk), meaning that the pair (∆zL,∆χ = ∆δL)
does not attain our targets for output and wage growth.
Table D3: Model with Ω = ωy – 1967-1987
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
13.29 31.88 – – – 6.83 4.93
13.29 – – – – -19.06 -1.29
– 31.88 – – – 18.55 4.89
– 32.26 -29.05 – – 6.59 4.69
– 37.54 – -41.83 – 17.85 15.75
– 198.96** – – -95.76** 37.90** 36.25**
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1967-1987 using our model with proportional entry costs, as
explained in Section 5.2. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes of the
shocks to the parameters, which are calibrated such that our model targets the growth rates of output and wages in
1967-1987. The last two columns show the implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result
of the shocks to the parameters. In the data, the labor share fell 0.7% and employment increased 12.8% in 1967-1987.
See Section 4.3 for more details on the experiments. Note that the algorithm that runs our simulations is unable to
converge in the experiment considered in the last line (the values are marked with double asterisk), meaning that the
pair (∆zL,∆χ = ∆δL) does not attain our targets for output and wage growth.
